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THEISM OF THE UPANISHADS

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**LECTURES ON THE
THEISM OF THE UPANISHADS
AND OTHER SUBJECTS**

BY
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PREFACE

The first four of the lectures comprised in this book were written at the request of the Secretary, Trust Society, Dyal Singh College, Lahore. They were originally intended to form parts of a series of twelve which I was invited to deliver at the College named. But from various causes, specially ill-health and the growing infirmities of old age, I failed either to complete the proposed series or proceed to Lahore. The Trust Society however has kindly undertaken to publish the following six lectures at their own expense and also intend, I understand, to have them read before a Lahore audience including the *alumni* of the Dyal Singh College. I am deeply grateful to them for this act of kindness.

The method adopted in the lectures on the Upanishads—the exposition of their central doctrine in connection with the most remarkable of the stories told in them—will be evident from the detailed table of contents given; and will, it is hoped, make it easier for the ordinary reader to follow the discussion than if only a rigidly logical method were followed. The two lectures on Hegel will not only introduce to the Indian public a school of thought little known to it, though in deep harmony with the teachings of the Upanishads, but will also, it is hoped, help to elucidate those principles which lie at the basis of my exposition of our scriptures both in this and my other works.

Lectures IV and VI present a somewhat full though necessarily brief exposition of the rational basis of Theism—the latter mostly in the words of the greatest of modern philosophers,—so that the book will be found to contain within a small compass both the national and philosophical aspects of the religion which, under various names, is fast becoming the common creed of educated Indians. With the fervent prayer

that it may, under Divine Providence, be a humble instrument in the great cause of Indian regeneration, I humbly send it to the reading public.

CALCUTTA, {
June, 1921. }

THE AUTHOR

CONTENTS

Lecture I.—The Idealism of the Upanishads

Story of Aruni and Svetaketu—Knowing all things by knowing the One—Aruni's conception of God—His method of reaching the Absolute—His Absolute a subject, not a substance—Story of Narada and Sanatkumara—The latter's method of reaching the Infinite—His definition of the Infinite—The true and the false Infinite—Story of Gargi and Yajnavalkya—The latter's conception of 'Akshara' as comprehending and transcending space—Story of Maitreyi and Yajnavalkya—The latter's view of the Self as supremely dear, all-comprehensive and indestructible—Two varieties of Idealism in the Upanishads—Dialogue between Indra and Prata-dana—Teaches Absolute Idealism. ... Pp. 1-35.

Lecture II.—The God of the Upanishads

Distinction of four states of the Self, *viz.* waking, dreaming, dreamless sleep and a fourth state, the basis of Upanishadic Theology—Dialogue between Janaka and Yajnavalkya on the same—Yajnavalkya's teaching on Absolute Monism and the merging of the finite self in the Infinite—Dialogue between Indra and Prajapati—Teaches qualified Monism and the persistence of the finite in relation to the Infinite—Personal relations of the two recognised in the Upanishads. ... Pp. 36-66.

Lecture III.—Ethical and Emotional Religion in the Upanishads

Story of Yama and Nachiketas—Conditions of theological discipleship—The Good and the Pleasant—The Supreme Good is union with God—Important place of acquiring a knowledge of God among religious duties—Emotional and practical aspects of knowledge—How the Upanishads teach the moral attributes of God—The *Svetasvatara* on the Divine Personal-

ity—Upanishadic Doctrine of Love—Cause and effect of misunderstanding and misinterpreting it—Gradual growth of love in quantity and quality. ... Pp. 67-105.

Lecture IV.—Modern Theism in the Light of Upanishadic Theism

Proofs of God's existence in modern Rational Theology—The four proofs really four forms or stages of Theism—Causal or Cosmological Proof—Its limitations—Forms of so-called Theism lower than the first stage—Teleological Proof—Its limitations—Ontological Proof—Its ancient and modern forms—Nature of the Theism established by it—Moral Proof—Evil a metaphysical and moral necessity—Estimate of current systems of Theism, specially those taught by Dayananda and Vivekananda, by the standard laid down—Statement and Criticism of modern Pluralism. ... Pp. 106-133.

Lecture V.—The Religious Aspect of Hegel's Philosophy

Religion and Philosophy inseparable in Hegel—Theory of 'Faculties' and that of stages of thought—Distinction of Sensation and Conception—Main question of Transcendental Logic—The Critical and the Dialectical Method—Divisions of Hegel's Logic—Popular, Scientific and Philosophical Thought—Imperfect Anticipations of the Dialectical Method in Hindu Philosophy—Supreme importance of Method in the interpretation of the Upanishads. ... Pp. 134-148.

Lecture VI.—Hegel's View of Theism and Christianity

Kant's Criticism of the Theistic proofs and Hegel's Defence of them—Cosmological Proof—Teleological Proof—Means and Ends—Ontological Proof—Unity-in-difference of God and man—Hegel's Exposition of the Trinity—His attitude towards Historical Christianity—Hegel's View of Worship and union with God. (Appendix) The Finite an essential moment of the Infinite—Holy Spirit the most concrete form of Reality and therefore eternal—Positive utterances on Immortality.

Pp. 149-181

THE THEISM OF THE UPANISHADS

LECTURE I

THE IDEALISM OF THE UPANISHADS

There is a remarkable story in the *Chhândogya Upanishad* which we may take as the starting point of our discussion. It is the story of Uddálaka Aruni and his son Svetaketu. Uddálaka Aruni is a noted name in the Upanishads, recurring in several of them, and seems to point to a historical person, a theological inquirer and teacher. It is he who is said to have uttered the well-known and oft-repeated *mahávákya*, great saying, of the Vedanta, “*Tat tvan asi*,”—“Thou art That”—“Thou art one with Brahman”—and this famous utterance occurs in the very story I refer to. The story begins with Aruni’s injunction to Svetaketu to place himself, as every ‘twice-born’ boy, at any rate every Bráhmaṇa boy, was expected to do in those days, under a teacher and study the Vedas. ‘*स्वेतकेतो, वस ब्रह्मचर्यं, न वै सोम्यास्रत् कुलीनोऽननूच्य ब्रह्मवन्मुखि भवति*’—‘Svetaketu,’ says Aruni, ‘go and live as a religious student, for there is none of our family,

my dear, who has not studied the Vedas and who is as it were a Bráhmāna only by birth.' Sankara explains 'ब्रह्मवन्धु' as 'ब्राह्मणान् वन्धून् व्यपदिशति, न स्वयं ब्राह्मण-वृत्त इति'—'One who calls Bráhmanas his relatives, but does not himself behave like a Bráhmāna.' Usually the term means an unworthy or nominal Bráhmāna. If a Bráhmāna who does not study the Vedas deserves to be called a 'ब्रह्मवन्धु', one wonders how many thousands, nay millions, of Bráhmanas of these days fall under the condemnation. However, the boy follows his father's injunctions, joins a Vedic school, and spends not less than twelve years in studying the sacred writings,—about the same time that would take a smart boy of these days to study our high school and college courses and come out as an M.A. or M.Sc. The effect on his mind, however, of this prolonged study of sacred literature was anything but sacred. We read : 'स ह द्वादशवर्ष उपेत्य चतुर्विंशतिवर्षः सर्वान् वेदान् अधीत्य महामना अनुचानमानी स्तब्ध एवाय ।'—'Having gone when twelve years old, he, after studying all the Vedas, came back when he was twenty-four years of age, greatly conceited, considering himself well-read, and arrogant.' The reason was evident to his father. The boy had studied all the sciences of those days, but he had not studied the science of sciences—Theology,

the science of God. The earlier parts of the Vedas do not, except incidentally, and in a halting, tentative manner, treat of God. The Upanishads, which are identical with that science, had not yet been composed and arose in fact out of the teachings of men like Aruni and Yájñavalkya. That Aruni had a true conception of that science, truer than what many modern theists possess, appears from the very question with which he confronts his son and shames his learned conceit, and from his subsequent amplification of that question. 'तं होवाच श्वेतकेतो

यन्नु सोम्येदं महामना अनूचानमानी स्वब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राच्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति, अमृतं मतम्, अविज्ञातं विज्ञातम् इति' ।—“ Aruni said to him,

Svetaketu, since you are so conceited, considering yourself well-read, and arrogant, did you ask for that instruction by which the unheard becomes heard, the unperceived becomes perceived, and the unknown becomes known? ” This was bewildering to Svetaketu and he asked in wonder, 'कथं नु भगवः स आदेशो भवति ?'—‘ How can there be such an instruction, Sir? ’ Aruni replied.

‘यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्व्वं मृत्तमयं विज्ञातं स्याद्, वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् । यथा सौम्यैकेन लोहमणिना सर्व्वं लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्याद्,

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं लोहमित्येव सत्यं । यथा
 सोम्यैकेन नखकुन्तनेन सर्व्वं कार्णायसं विज्ञातं स्याद्,
 वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं कृष्णायसमित्येव सत्यम्, एवं
 सोम्य स आदेशो भवतीति ।—‘ Just as, my dear, by a
 single clod of clay all that is made of
 clay becomes known,—all modifications being
 only a name made of words, the reality being
 only clay; just as, my dear, by a single
 nugget of gold all that is made of gold
 becomes known,—all modifications being only a
 name made of words, the reality being only
 gold; just as, my dear, by a single pair of nail-
 cutters all that is made of iron becomes known,
 —all modifications being only a name made of
 words and the reality being only iron,
 so, my dear, is that instruction.’ Now,
 the boy found that he had had no such
 instruction in his college, and so said,
 ‘न वै नूनं भगवन्सस्त एतद्वेदिषु यद्वेत्तद्वेदिष्यन् कथं
 मे नावच्छन् इति, भगवांस्त्वेव मे तदब्रवीतु इति ।’—
 ‘ Surely those venerable men did not know
 this; for, if they knew it, why should not they
 have told it to me? Do you tell it to me, Sir?’
 The conditions of true discipleship were fulfilled
 in Svetaketu. He acknowledged his ignorance
 of the truth of all truths and expressed a hearty
 desire to know it. Hence without trying him
 further and taking him through a course of pre-

liminary training and preparation, Aruni at once began to impart to him the science of God.

Now, before we enter into Aruni's exposition of the science of God, as he conceived it, we may as well see what may be gathered from the question he puts to his son, and from its amplification. As I have said, it seems to imply a higher conception of that science than what many modern theists possess. Aruni's conception of God is that he is the substance, the essence, of all that we see, hear, know and think, so that when we know him, what was unseen becomes seen, what was unheard becomes heard, what was unknown becomes known, and what was unthought of becomes an object of thought. As things made of clay, gold and iron are nothing but these substances, the forms only being different, the essence the same,—so all things seen, heard, known and thought of are nothing but God, who has assumed the various forms which appear to our senses and understanding. Underlying these innumerable appearances is the Supreme Reality. The differences are only apparent, only nominal, verbal, वाचरभ्यसम्, the Unity alone is real. However, in the exposition that follows, Aruni tries to show by various illustrations that things apparently different are really one, that what appears gross really rises out of what is subtle. All these illustrations, however, are based on the idea that the primary elements out of which all

things have arisen are fire, water and earth in their most subtle forms, and that these three elements are mere differentiations of the fundamental Unity, *Sat*, the True. Fire, water and earth are, Aruni thinks, mixed up in various proportions in all things, including life and mind, and form their substrata. He analyses visible fire, the sun, the moon, lightning, the human body and mind, and finds in them nothing but combinations of the original fire, water and earth. In these primal elements as conceived by Aruni we find the origin of the three fundamental *gunas* of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy,—*sattvan*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the principles of luminosity, activity and inertia, which constitute *Prakriti*. However, according to our philosopher, mind itself—thought, memory and understanding—rises out of these elements. He illustrates this by asking Svetaketu to abstain from food for fifteen days and live only on water. When Svetaketu had done this, he found that he had forgotten the Vedas and could not repeat them when asked to do so by his father. But when he took food again, the forgotten things came back to his mind. Then his father said to him:—‘यथा सोम्य महतोऽभ्याहितस्यैकमङ्गारं खद्योतमात्रं परिशिष्टं तं तृणैरुपसमाधाय प्राञ्चयेत् तेन ततोऽपि बहु दहेत् एवं सोम्य ते षोडशानां कलानाम् एका कलाऽतिशेषोऽभूत् साऽन्नेनोपसमाहिता प्राञ्चाली तथैतर्हि वेदाननुभवसि ।

अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मन आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वाक्।'—'Just as, my dear, of a great lighted fire, if a single coal, of the size of a fire-fly, is left, and if people blaze it up by adding grass to it, it would burn much more,—so, my dear, of your sixteen parts* only one part was left to you; and that being lighted up with food, blazed up; and by that thou rememberest the Vedas. The mind, my dear, consists of food, life of water, and speech of fire.'

Now, Aruni's scientific conceptions, whether they relate to matter, life or mind, are not likely to draw respect in these days of clear and exact method, and so we may leave them untouched. What he is in search of is unity in the midst of difference, and where positive knowledge fails him, he supplies its place by fancy or tradition. Let us take it for granted for a moment that all things can ultimately be reduced to three primary elements—fire, water and earth. The real question for Theology and Philosophy is "How can these three be reduced to God, the True?" Now, Aruni gives us no clear and convincing answer to this question. But it may be supposed, from the way in which he reduces the innumerable differences of things to three primary elements, that the conception which guides him is that of *sub-*

* The five vital airs, the five organs of knowledge, the five of action, and *manas*.

stance, that the differences are conceived by him as so many attributes inhering in the primary elements as substances, and that these elements themselves are conceived by him as attributes of a primal substance which he calls *Sat*, the True, or Pure Being. That this is Aruni's method of reaching the Absolute, may seem apparent from the following among similar other passages. Conceiving of the body as an offshoot which has been brought forth by the digestion of food with the help of water, Aruni says :—

‘तत्रैतच्छुद्धमापतितं सोम्य विजानीहि नेदममूलं भविष्यतीति । तस्य क्व मूलं स्याद् अन्यत्रास्माद् एवमेव खलु सोम्याग्नेन शुद्धेनापोमूलमन्विच्छ, अग्निः सोम्य शुद्धेन तेजोमूलमन्विच्छ, तेजसा सोम्य शुद्धेन सम्भूलमन्विच्छ । सम्भूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदायतनाः सत्प्रतिष्ठाः ।’ —‘Thus, my dear, know this offshoot to be brought forth, for it could not be without a root. And where could its root be except in food (or earth)? And in the same manner, my dear, as food (or earth) too is an offshoot, seek after its root, namely water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, namely fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, namely the True. Yes, all these creatures, my dear, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True.’

But if this were really Aruni's method of reach-

ing his Absolute, if he were guided by the conception of substance and attribute, or matter and form, of material cause (उपादान कारण) and its effect or modification, his *Sat* would be a mere Substance and not a Subject, not a Conscious Being. But on examining Aruni's account of creation we find that his *Sat*, from which everything comes out, is really a Conscious Being, a Person, and that creation, as conceived by our philosopher, is a conscious process. It is not indeed creation in the Christian sense, the starting up of a reality which was non-existent; but it is the conscious differentiation of an original Unity. Let us allow Aruni to speak for himself.

He says :—‘सदेव मोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तद्वैक आहु रसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् तस्मादसतः सज्जायत । कुतस्तु खलु सोम्येवं स्याद् इति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत्त्वेव मोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत्तेजोऽसृजत तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत ।...ता आप ऐक्षन्त वह्नयः स्याम प्रजायेमहि ता अन्नमसृजन्त ।’—

“ In the beginning, my dear, there was only the True, one only without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was only the not-true or non-being, one only without a second; and from the not-true the True was born. But how could it be thus, my dear? the father continued, how could the True be born of the not-true?

No, my dear, only the True was in the beginning, one only without a second. It thought 'May I be many, may I grow forth?' It created, (or rather, sent forth) fire. That fire (that is, the True in the form of fire) thought, 'May I be many, may I grow forth.' It created water. Water (that is, the True in the form of water) thought 'May I be many, may I grow forth.' It created food (or earth)."

Thus every step in the creation conceived by Aruni is a conscious process, and the differentiations of the original unity are not things or realities apart from, but essentially one with, it. The account of creation is also evidently a poetic representation of an eternal fact. Just as the *Sat* or True could not be born of an *asat* or not-true, so the *bahu* or many could not come out of a pure unity without difference. To come out of it, the many must potentially exist in the One. This is in a manner recognised by the 'इच्छा' or thought of the True from which the world is said to have come out. Before becoming many the True thought of becoming so. The many was in his thought. But to the Absolute, thinking and being are one, which we shall see clearly as we proceed. Aruni's doctrine is thus a system of Idealism in miniature,—a system in which things are really thoughts, and thoughts are differentiations of a conscious Reality,—in which the ideal and the real—knowledge and ex-

istence—are one. It is a doctrine of the Absolute Idea—the unity-in-difference of subject and object, though the teacher is far from clearly stating it, not to speak of expounding it in a convincing manner.

Another teacher named in the *Cchhándogya* gives on the whole a more satisfactory statement of the doctrine. It is Sanatkumára, said to be the same as Skanda or Kártikeya, the god of war. What a strange transformation the philosophic god of war has undergone at the hands of us, Bengalis, who represent him as a fop riding upon a peacock ! However, in our story he is approached by Nárada as a religious inquirer. Nárada also is transformed in course of time. In the Puranas he is represented as an itinerant singer and a worshipper of Vishnu ; but the Upanishadic Nárada is a scholar and a seeker of true knowledge. He has studied the Vedas and all the other branches of knowledge recognised in his time. But this has given him no satisfaction. He is far from being conceited and arrogant like Svetaketu. He feels that the highest truth, the truth which helps one to rise above sorrow, has not been gained by him. He says with touching modesty :—“सोऽहं भगवो मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मवित्, श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्विशेष्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति, सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि, तं मा भगवाच्छोकस्य पारं तारयत्विति ।” —’But, Sir, with all this I know only the sacred

texts, I do not know the self. I have heard from men like you that he who knows the self overcomes sorrow. I am in sorrow. Do, Sir, help me to overcome it.' Sanatkumára leads him up a ladder of twenty-one conceptions, the lowest of which is 'name' (náma) and the highest the infinite (Bhúmá). This reminds one of the gradual march of conceptions in Hegel's *Logic* from Being up to the Absolute Idea. But the analogy ends here. One does not see, except occasionally here and there, how one conception rises out of another and what makes one higher than that which precedes it. There is no real dialectic in the movement. But whatever may have been his method, Sanatkumára seems to have arrived at a true idea of the Infinite; and Prof. Max Muller truly says in his Gifford lectures on Psychological Religion that no truer definition of the Infinite than what our philosopher gives has ever since been given. Sanatkumára says :—'यत्र नान्यत् पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद् विजानाति स भूमा । अथ यत्रान्यत् पश्यति अन्यच्छृणोति अन्यद् विजानाति तदल्पं । यो वै भूमा तदन्ततमम् अथ यदल्पं तन्मर्थ्यं, स भगवः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति स्वे महिम्नि, यदि वा न महिम्नीति । गो अश्वमिह महिमेत्याचक्षते हस्ति हिरण्यं दासभार्यं क्षेत्रान्यायतना नीति, नाहमेवं ब्रवीमि ब्रवीमीति होवाच, अन्यो ह्यन्य-
स्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति । स एवाधस्तात् स उपरिष्ठात् स

पश्चात् स पुरस्तात् स दक्षिणतः स उत्तरतः स एवेदं सर्वम् इति । अथातोऽहंकारादेश एव अहमेवाधस्ताद् अहमुपरिष्ठाद् अहं पश्चाद् अहं दक्षिणतोऽहमुत्तरतोऽहमेवेदं सर्वमिति । अथात आत्मादेश एव आत्मैवाधस्ताद् आत्मोपरिष्ठाद् आत्मा पश्चाद् आत्मा पुरस्ताद् आत्मा दक्षिणत आत्मोत्तरत आत्मैवेदं सर्वमिति ।”—

“ Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the finite. The Infinite is immortal, the finite mortal. ‘ Sir, (says Nárada), in what does the Infinite rest? ’ ‘ In its greatness (replied Sanatkumára) or rather not in greatness. In the world they call cows and horses, elephants and gold, slaves, wives, fields and houses (marks of) greatness. I do not mean this, thus he spoke, for in that case one thing rests in something else. The Infinite indeed is below, above, behind, before, to the right and left—it is indeed all this. Now follows the explanation of the Infinite as I : I am above, I am behind, before, to the right and left—I am all this. Next follows the explanation of the Infinite as the self : The self is below, above, behind, before, to the right and left, the self is all this? ’ Now, I cannot expect that the mere verbal translation I have given you of this remarkable passage will help you in grasp-

ing its purport. I must therefore say a few words in its explanation, if at all any words of mine will help those to understand it who have never given any thought to the subject. The Infinite, it will be readily admitted, is that which excludes nothing, beyond which nothing exists. It is the whole. But how is the whole got? How do we know it? The common idea is that it is got by adding up all things. If we could add up all things known and unknown, we would get the Infinite. But as we cannot do so, as all things cannot be known, so we do not know the infinite. But really this so called Infinite, which is a fancied sum of all finite things known and unknown, is only the Indefinite and not the real Infinite. No sum of finite things, however great, can make the Infinite. Such a sum would always leave something beyond it and would not therefore be the Infinite. The real Infinite is not such a baffling thing; it is really known in knowing every finite thing as finite. It is, as Emerson says, as perfect in an atom as in a universe. In knowing every thing, we know what we call our own self, what at first sight appears to be something as finite as anything else we know, but which on a closer view is found to be nothing less than the Self of the universe. In knowing extended things, one thing is known as beside or beyond another, but the self which knows them is not known as beside or beyond them; it inclu-

des them within its sphere of knowledge—not as one portion of space includes several smaller portions, but in its unextended or spaceless grasp. And the self is not only not beyond its objects of knowledge, but beyond it there is nothing. Everything that is known is known in the self. Everything that is thought of is and must be thought of as in the self. When you think you know or think of things as beyond the self, you really lose sight of the essential character of the self as an unextended spaceless principle of knowledge and identify it with an extended thing. Conceived as such a principle, the self is 'all-inclusive, undivided and absolutely one. It may have many manifestations or expressions, as the self of individual persons, but in its primary essence it cannot but be one, and as one, infinite. Our philosopher, Sanatkumára, sees all this. He sees that what he calls his self is a real manifestation of the Infinite, that in seeing and knowing it he sees and knows nothing else. In seeing, that is, knowing, the note-book in my hand, I know my self and the book in it. I know nothing beyond my self. In hearing a sound, I know my self and the sound in it. In knowing the space beyond my body and things in that space, I really know what I call my self, in its non-individual universal aspect, and all things in it. And so यत्र, in which, न अन्यत् पश्यति, one sees nothing else than it, न अन्यच्छृणोति, one hears nothing else

than it, न अन्यद् विजानाति, one knows nothing else than it, स भूमा, that is the Infinite. When one thus knows the fundamental unity of subject and object, of the knowing and the known, of knowing and being, one sees that in every act of knowledge he really knows nothing but this unity as his own self—limited indeed in its sensuous manifestation, that is, in so far as he, in his practical life, identifies it with an object of sense,—but really infinite, and in virtue of its infinitude and all-inclusiveness enabling him to see, hear and know all things. We may, as I have said, miss the self's unspatial, all-inclusive nature, and ask, as Nārada does, 'स भगवः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितः ?'—'In what does the Infinite rest, Sir?' What answer can a real knower of the self give to such a question as this but the one given by Sanatkumāra, 'स्वे महिम्नि'—'in its own greatness or glory?' But lest the inquirer should think that this glory or greatness of the self is anything else than the self, like a man's property consisting in cows, horses, gold, etc., a true teacher like Sanatkumāra should retract even such a true answer, and say "यदि वा न महिम्नि"—'or rather not in its greatness, if you understand greatness as something else than the self wherein it rests, as one thing rests on another,'—'अन्यो हि अन्यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितः' । As it is really the self that we know in knowing

all things, our philosopher says: 'He is below, he is above, etc. He is all this.' Lest the third personal pronoun should carry the impression that the Infinite spoken of is anything essentially different from what we call our own self, he corrects this impression by using the first personal pronoun and the word 'self': 'I am below, I am above, etc., I am all this. The self is below, the self is above, etc. The self is all this.'

Let us now turn to another teacher of the Upanishads, in many respects the ablest of these teachers, one who will give us more light than we have yet got on the relation of subject and object, their difference and their unity. I refer to Vájasaneyá Yájnavalkya, of whose learned colloquies with the ladies Gárgi and Maitreyí many of you must have heard something. The dialogue between Yájnavalkya and Gárgí is to be found in the third chapter of the *Brihadáranayaka Upanishad*. The whole of this chapter is occupied with an account of an assembly which is said to have met on the occasion of a sacrifice offered by King Janaka of Videha or Mithilá. This account gives a fair idea of the high state of civilisation and the height of religious speculation attained by our ancestors,—and they were our close neighbours, the Beharis—about three thousand years ago. The *Brihadáranayaka*, which is an integral part of

the *Satapatha Bráhmana*, is one of the most ancient of the Upanishads. We may safely guess that Buddha read or learnt it from oral instruction about six hundred years before Christ. Its composition, therefore, or the state of society depicted in it, cannot be later than one thousand years before Christ. That such abstruse questions as we find discussed in this chapter were debated in a royal assembly, at such an early age, and that a lady, a maiden in all probability, sat in that assembly of the most learned in the land and took an active part in the debate—all this must fill every Hindu heart with honest pride in the glorious past of his country's history and a genuine desire for the return of those glorious days. However, to return to a brief account of the assembly convoked by Janaka, this great patron of Vedic learning conceived what may appear to us a rather queer way of ascertaining which of the many learned persons assembled on the occasion—men and women both, as we may guess from the presence of Gárgí there—was the most well-read in the Vedas, 'ब्रह्मिष्ठ' or 'अनुचानतम' । Besides the many presents offered by him to the priests, he enclosed a thousand cows near the place of sacrifice and fastened ten *pádas* (a measurement) of gold to the horns of each. Addressing the assembly, to which Bráhmanas had come from distant kingdoms like the Kurus

and the Panchálas, the king said, "Ye venerable Bráhmanas, he who among you is the wisest, let him drive away these cows." No one dared to respond to this bold challenge till Yájnavalkya, whose views we are now going to consider, told one of his pupils to drive the cows to his house. An angry murmur followed, in the midst of which Asvala, the Hotri priest of Janaka, that is the priest who recited the *Rigveda* for him, rose and said to the interpid acceptor of the challenge: "Are you indeed the wisest among us. O Yájnavalkya?" to which Yájnavalkya cleverly replied: "I bow down before the wisest, but I wish indeed to have these cows." This was a hint, given in a modest way, that any question on Vedic ritual and theology might be put to him and his learning tested thereby. No fewer than eight interlocutors responded to the invitation, and our philosopher answered and silenced everyone of them. Our present business is with Gárgí, who confronted him twice. We shall consider her second question, or rather set of questions, in answer to which Yájnavalkya expounded his view of the relation of space to Atman or Brahman. The bold manner, verging on irreverence, in which the question is put, is too noteworthy to be omitted. It seems to show that Gárgí was equal in age and social position to Yájnavalkya and perhaps had studied with him

in the same school, for there was co-education of men and women in those days in India as there is now in America, as must be clear to those who have read Bhavabhúti's *Uttara Rámacharita*, in which Atreyí says she was once a school-mate of Kusa and Lava in Válmiki's school. However, Gárgí stands up and says :

—“याज्ञवल्कर, यथा काश्यो वा वैदेहो वा उग्रपुत्र उज्ज्वल धनुरधिष्ठं कृत्वा द्वौ वानवन्तौ सपत्नातिथ्याधिनी हस्ते कृत्वा उपतिष्ठेद् एवमेवाहं त्वां दाभ्यां प्रश्नाभ्याम् उपदद्यां तौ मे ब्रूहीति ।” “पृच्छ गार्गीति ।”—“ O Yájnavalkya,

as the son of a warrior from Kashi or Videha might string his loosened bow, take two pointed foe-piercing arrows in his hand and rise to do battle, so have I risen to fight thee with two questions. Answer me these questions.” Yájnavalkya said, ‘ Ask O Gárgí? ’ Now Gárgí's first question on the present occasion relates to the most universal attribute of all sensuous things and Yájnavalkya's answer to it is, as could be expected, space or extension. I shall however let Gárgí herself speak :

‘सा होवाच यदूर्ध्वं याज्ञवल्कर दिवो, यदवाक् पृथिव्या, यदन्तरा द्यावा-पृथिवी इमे, यद्भूतञ्च भवञ्च भविष्यञ्च इति आचक्षते, कस्मिं स्तद् भूतञ्च प्रोतञ्च ईति ।’—

She said :—“O Yájnavalkya, that of which they say that it is above the heaven, beneath the

earth, embracing heaven and earth, past, present and future, tell me in what it is woven like warp and woof." Yájnavalkya replied :—

‘यदूर्ध्वं गार्गि दिवो यदवाक् पृथिव्या, यदन्तरा द्यावा-
पृथिवी इमे, यज्ञतश्च भवश्च भविष्यश्च इति आचक्षते,
आकाशे तद् ओतश्च प्रोतश्च इति ।’—‘That of which

they say that it is above the heaven, beneath the earth, embracing heaven and earth, past, present and future,—that is woven like warp and woof, in space.” Gárgí next asked :—

‘कस्मिन्नु खलु आकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च ?’—‘In what then is space woven, like warp and woof?’

To ask this question is to answer it rightly. Unreflective people, immersed in the senses, never ask it to themselves, and so never get its true answer. To them space is an independent reality, containing all things in heaven and earth, including even what they conceive to be their own selves, but contained in nothing else. But Gárgí saw that it is a dependent thing, dependent on or relative to consciousness or the self, which is the real Absolute. So

when Yájnavalkya said that it is the Akshara, the Imperishable or Absolute, in which space is woven, like warp and woof, she was satisfied and spoke no more. Yájnavalkya at first defines this Akshara only in negative terms, as he

could not but do :—“एतद् वै तदक्षरं गार्गि ब्राह्मणा

अभिवदन्ति—अस्थूलम् अनणु अज्वलम् अदीर्घम् अलो-
हितम् अस्नेहम्” &c.—‘ O Gárgí, the Bráhmaṇas
call this the Akshara. It is neither gross nor
fine, neither red (like fire) nor fluid (like water),
and so on. That to which everything finite is
relative cannot have the attribute of
any finite thing. If we ascribe any of
these attributes to the Absolute, we do
so only in a relative sense. But by
and by Yájnavalkya assumes a more positive
tone though retaining a negative attitude. He
enumerates some of the more impressive phe-
nomena of nature and ascribes them to the com-
mand of the Akshara : ‘एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने
गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठत, एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य
प्रशासने गार्गि द्यावा-पृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठत, एतस्य वा
अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि निमेषा मुहूर्त्ता अहोरात्राणि
अर्धमासा मासा ऋतवः संवत्सरा इति विधृतास्तिष्ठन्ति ।’
—“ By the command of that Akshara, O
Gárgí, sun and moon are upheld in their
places. By the command of that Akshara, O
Gárgí, heaven and earth are upheld in their
places. By the command of that Akshara, O
Gárgí, what are called moments, hours, days,
nights, half-months, months, seasons, years, all
stay upheld in their places.” What Yájnavalkya
does not forget, in excluding finite attributes
from the Absolute, is that knowledge is not

such an attribute, but is rather the very essence of the Absolute. He says :—"तद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्गी अदृष्टं द्रष्टुं, अश्रुतं श्रोतुं, अमृतं मन्तुं, अविज्ञातं विज्ञातुं, नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टुं, नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतुं, नान्यादतोऽस्ति मन्तुं, नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञातुं ।"—' This Akshara, O Gárgí, is unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unthought of, but thinking; unknown, but knowing. There is no other seer than he; no other hearer than he; no other thinker than he; no other knower than he.' Yájnavalkya means that the knowledge which finite beings like us call their own really proceeds from and belongs to the Absolute. But our knowledge is apparently dualistic and seems to be limited by time and space. How can it belong to the Absolute? We shall see by and by how Yájnavalkya answers this question. But before we do this we should hear him further on the relation of subject and object, on which he speaks very clearly in his conversation with his own wife Maitreyí. This conversation is given, with slight variations, in Chapter II, Section 4 and Chapter IV, Section 5 of the *Bṛihadárányaka*, and is called the ' Maitreyí Bráhmāna,' each section of the *Bṛihadárányaka Upanishad* being called a *Bráhmāna*. Yájnavalkya was blessed, or, as we would now say, cursed, with two wives,—Maitreyí and Kátyá-

yaní. The difficulty of this position was somewhat relieved by a happy division of endowments and, we many expect, of duties and functions also, in the ladies. Maitreyí was, we are told, a Brahnavádiní, one devoted to the study of Theology, while Kátyáyani was, we are assured, *Stríprajná*, versed in matters peculiar to women,—matters relating to domestic management we may suppose,—so that our philosopher's home life, we may fancy, was not disturbed hopelessly by conflicting interests and rivalries. However, when the time came for Yájnavalkya to enter the third *ásrama*, that is *vánaprastha* or forest life, he proposed to make a division of his property between the co-wives. Maitreyí had little interest in worldly matters. Perhaps she was childless, as I have represented her in my novelette *Maitreyí*. And she was saddened by the thought that even up to the time of her sage husband's retirement from worldly life she had not learned anything from him on immortality. When therefore it was proposed to settle a part of the property on her, she is said to have asked with striking simplicity, “यन्मु म इयन्मगोः सर्व्वाः पृथिवी विस्तेन पृष्ठा स्यात्, कथं तेनामृता स्यामिति ?”——“My Lord, if this whole earth, full of wealth, belonged to me, tell me should I be immortal by it? ” “नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यो, यथैवोपकरणवतां जीवितं तथैव ते जीवितं स्याद् अमृतत्वस्य

तु नाशस्ति वित्तेनेति।”—“No, replied Yájnavalkya, like the life of rich people will be thy life. But there is no hope of immortality by wealth.” Maitreyí said, “येनाहं नानृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्यां, यदेव भगवान् वेद तदेव मे ब्रूहीति।”—“What should I do with that by which I would not become immortal? What you know, Sir, (of immortality) please tell that to me.” Yájnavalkya was overjoyed by this answer of his dear wife and said that by this she had increased his love for her. How many wives of the present age would give such an answer and put such a question to their husbands and how many husbands would be found fit to be thus addressed by their wives? However, Yájnavalkya proceeded immediately to explain his doctrine of immortality.

Starting from his love for his wife just expressed, Yájnavalkya said :—“न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति । न वा अरे जायायै कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय जाया प्रिया भवति ।”—“Behold, not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear, but for the sake of the self is the husband dear. Behold, not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear, but for the sake of the self is the wife dear.” In this strain Yájnavalkya speaks of sons, wealth, the Bráhmaṇa caste, to which he belonged, the Kshatriya caste, which

was next to his, and to which his patron Janaka belonged, and then the worlds, the deities, the creatures, and all things in general, as dear to us not for themselves, but for the self. By the 'self' Yájnavalkya does not mean each person's separate individuality, but the Universal Self in each person ; for he distinctly says :—

“आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः अतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यो मैत्रेयि, आत्मनि खलु अरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञाते इदं सर्वं विदितम् । ”—“ Verily the Self is to be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon, O Maitreyí; when the Self has been seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon, then all this is known.”

Again : ‘इदं ब्रह्म, इदं क्षत्रम्, इमे लोका, इमे देवा, इमानि भूतानि, इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा’—‘ This Bráhma caste, this Kshatra caste, these worlds, these deities, all these beings, all this is the Self.’ This unity of subject and object is emphasised by Yájnavalkya with the declaration that the Bráhmanas, the Kshatriyas, the creatures, the deities, everything should disown—‘ परादात् ’—him who looks for any of these things elsewhere than in the Self, the purport of which seems to be that no real knowledge of anything is gained unless it is seen in essential relation to the one universal Self. What we call the human self, then, being one with the Universal Self in relation to which

everything exists, it is impossible that it can die. As Yájnavalkya says to Maitreyí,—‘अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा, अनुच्छिन्निधर्मा’—‘Verily, beloved, this Self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature.’ But a question now arises, If subject and object are really one, and if there is ultimately one undivided subject or self, are the differences of objects and subjects which characterise human knowledge merely apparent, the result of human limitation? Are they absent in the Absolute, and will they be dropped from us when we reach our goal, that is final immortality, oneness with the Absolute? Yájnavalkya’s last words with Maitreyí, the last words of the ‘Maitreyí Bráhmaṇa,’ have often been interpreted as an affirmative answer to this question, as teaching a doctrine of unqualified Monism and of the final merging of human personality in an undifferentenced unity of consciousness. I think that the words admit of a different construction, and that even if Yájnavalkya does teach such a doctrine, there are other *rishis* of the Upanishads who do not teach it, and who teach a very different doctrine, one which, I think, is more rational, and more in harmony with the highest human aspirations.

Now, before we proceed further let us take stock of what we have already got, what the

rishis we have so far consulted have taught us over and above the deliverances of common sense unenlightened by philosophical insight. Common sense looks upon the world from a merely objective standpoint. To it objects seem apart from one another in space, events following one another in time, and all objects and changes of objects independent of the subjects taking notice of them. Knowledge seems to it only an accidental and passing relation between objects and subjects and not entering into their essential nature. It thinks of unknown objects, objects unknown to any intelligence whatever, and of unknowing, unconscious subjects, without detecting any self-contradiction in such thinking. Now, all true philosophical thinking starts from a consciousness of the inadequacy of this common sense view of matter and mind, subject and object, things and thoughts. It sees more or less distinctly the contradiction involved in it and endeavours to rise to a self-consistent view of things. Systems proceeding upon the common sense view and merely elaborating it, dealing with the various classes of objects, gross and subtle, and the various faculties of the mind, may be so much speculation, but do not deserve to be called Philosophy. The composers of the Upanishads, at any rate some of them, are true philosophers in as much as they see the inadequacy of the com.

mon sense view and look upon the world from a higher standpoint. This standpoint is that of knowledge. They see that, in Longfellow's words, 'Things are not what they seem,' that their relation to the knowing subject is not passing or accidental, that they are not independent of knowledge, not realities apart from the knowing subject. They also see that the knowing subject has not the manifoldness and limitations of objects in space and time, that though knowing many objects, far and near, it is neither many nor far or near, but one and spaceless, and that in knowing passing events it does not itself pass away. Hence they conclude that there is really one undivided Reality, conscious and infinite—'*Satyam jñānam anantam*'—as the basis of all things and thoughts.

Now, so far there is a striking unanimity among the *rishis* of the Upanishads, and so far they seem to be on quite safe ground—on a foundation firm and immovable. But now comes a difficulty, an obscurity and a real difference of view. The dualism which the philosophers we have so far dealt with have disposed of is the common sense dualism of subject and object, of matter and mind, of things and thoughts, as mutually independent realities. It is also the same dualism of the individual and the universal self as apart from one another. It is shown that the one is only a finite manifes-

tation of the other. The difference thus rejected by the thinkers of the Upanishads is, we should distinctly see, difference *as opposed* to unity, the difference conceived and believed by unenlightened common sense. But is there not a difference which is not only not opposed to unity, but which is related,—even necessarily related—to it? Objects of sense are indeed not independent of sense or the knowing subject, but dependent on it. In this sense they are one with it. But their fundamental unity with it does not reduce them to a dead unity and take away their difference-in-unity. Red and blue are both sensations of the same mind, and thus one with it, but this does not make them absolutely one: they are different, not as mutually independent realities, but as different sensations of the same mind—they are a difference-in-unity. Two or more portions of space as contained in one continuous whole are not objects absolutely different, but a difference-in-unity. The unity of space is relative to the unspatial unity of consciousness. The difference of space and the unspatial is not a difference of two independent realities, but a unity-in-difference. In the same manner, all individual selves or souls, as we call them, are, as our *rishis* rightly teach, manifestations, expressions, effects, creations, emanations, off-shoots—whatever language may be found suitable to express the rela-

tion—off-shoots, let us say with Aruni, of an Infinite Self, and are in this sense one with it. But this fundamental unity does not do away with their individual differences and reduce them to a dead colourless unity. In fact the relation of each individual self to the Universal Self is a unity-in-difference and their relation to one another a difference-in-unity. Now, what perplexes and confuses a student of the Upanishads and what has confused and hopelessly divided their expounders and followers, is that the *rishis*, at any rate some of them, do not clearly see the distinction between the two kinds of difference just explained,—the difference which is opposed to unity and the one which is related, in fact necessarily related, to it. When they have seen the unity of the object with the subject, and thus got rid of the popular dualism of subject and object as independent realities, they think they have got rid of all difference whatever, and that the difference of subject and object is an illusion, a datum of ignorance, absent in the Universal Self and therefore to be got rid of in our endeavours to attain to the divine standpoint. In the same manner, when they have seen the essential unity of the individual and the Universal Self, and thus been freed from the popular error of supposing them to be mutually independent realities, they think they have disposed of all difference what-

ever, and that the still persisting consciousness of our difference from the Infinite has only to wait for death, when it will be finally got rid of. The Upanishadic *rishi* who most clearly sees the error of this sort of thinking, and the correlativity—the unity-in-difference—of subject and object, hides his identity under the mythological name of Indra, the god of thunder. We meet him in the *Kaushítaki* Upanishad forming part of the *Kaushítaki Aranyaka* attached to the *Rigveda*. The third chapter of this Upanishad is called the “Indra-Pratardana Sam-báda,” the dialogue between Indra and Pratardana, the son of Divodása. Indra is said to have been much pleased with Pratardana for his bravery and military skill, and promised him a boon. Pratardana asked the god himself to choose the boon for him—one which he deemed to be most beneficial to man. Indra said, “This I consider the most beneficial thing for man that he should know me.” Now, by ‘me’ Indra did not mean his limited individuality as a *deva*, as the *Vedánta Sútras* explain, and as one can see from the words of Indra himself in the story. For the time he abstracted from his individuality and identified himself, as Krishna does in the *Bhagavadgitá*, with the Universal Self in him : “स होवाच प्राणोस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा तं मामाशुरमृतमित्युपास्र ।”—“He said, ‘I am life. I

am the conscious self. 'Worship me as life, as breath.' " From the explanation that follows, it seems that by "Prána" Indra means the objective side of existence and by "Prajná" the subjective. Having spoken of speech, smell, form, sound, taste, action, pleasure and pain, etc., as depending on the subject or knower of these, he says, " ता वा एता दशैव भूतमात्रा अधिप्रज्ञं दश प्रज्ञामात्रा अधिभूतम् । यद्धि भूतमात्रा न स्युर्न प्रज्ञामात्राः स्युः । यद्वा प्रज्ञामात्रा न स्युर्न भूतमात्राः स्युः । नहि अन्यतरतो रूपं किञ्चन सिध्येत् । तद् यथा रथस्य अरेषु नेमिरर्पिती नाभौ अरा अर्पिताः । एवम् एव एता भूतमात्राः प्रज्ञामात्रास्तु अर्पिताः प्रज्ञामात्राः प्राणि अर्पिताः । स एष प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मानन्दोऽजरोऽमृतः । एष लोकपालः । एष लोकाधिपतिः । एष सर्वेशः । स मे आत्मा—इति विद्यात् । स मे आत्मा—इति विद्यात् ।"—" These ten elements of the objective world exist in relation to consciousness, and the ten elements or phases of consciousness exist in relation to the objective world. If there were no elements of the objective world, there would be no elements of consciousness. If there were no elements of consciousness, there would be no elements of the objective world. No form or entity is possible from only one of the two sides. This (i.e., the concrete reality) is not many (but

one). As the circumference of the wheel of a car is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, so are these elements of the objective world placed on the elements of consciousness, and the elements of consciousness placed on life. This life is the conscious Self—blissful, unfading and immortal. . . . He is the Guardian of the world. He is the Sovereign of the world. He is the Lord of all. One should know him thus —‘He is my self.’ ”

The nature of the Idealism presented in these texts is unmistakable. It is neither subjective nor objective : it is a system of Absolute Idealism, in which the subject and object, the individual and Universal, are related as distinct from and yet one with each other. It is very different from that system which is characterised by our Vaishnava philosophers as “*प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धम्*,” a disguised form of Buddhism, and which British Idealists like John and Edward Caird, and even their great master, Hegel, the German Idealist, erroneously identify with philosophical Hinduism and thereby do a grievous injustice to the latter. And this system leads to a view of immortality very different from that doctrine of utter merging in Brahman which, taught in the name of the religion of the Upanishads, has brought it into such bad odour and which justly repels all pious souls. The *Kaushitaki* gives a beautiful descrip-

tion of the gradual approach of the soul, disembodied by death, to Brahmaloka, the divine regions, its colloquy, when arrived there, with the Divine Being, and its final settlement there in the company of the *devas*. Nothing is said of the merging or annihilation of the individual self in the Universal. The same view of our final union with God, our liberation, is given in the *Chhândogya Upanishad* which is attached to the *Samaveda*. That Yájnavalkya of the *Sukla Yajurveda* may be interpreted as holding a different view, I have already suggested. It will thus be seen, even at this initial stage of our discussion, that the system of the Upanishads cannot be identified, as it is erroneously done, both in this country and in the west, with the doctrine of unity without difference with its necessary corollaries,—Monasticism as the ideal of earthly life, the denial of worship in the true sense, and the final annihilation of the individual self. Such views may have found favour with particular thinkers in the Upanishad period, but cannot be pronounced as parts of the teachings of the Upanishads as a whole. However, we must reserve a detailed consideration of these points for the future. For the present let us part, with the ancient prayer of the *Yajurveda* in our hearts,—‘असतो मा सद्गमय, तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय, मृत्योर्मांमृतं गमय’ ।

शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः, हरिः ओं ।

LECTURE II

THE GOD OF THE UPANISHADS

The Upanishads make much of the distinction of the three states of the soul, the waking, the dreaming, and dreamless sleep, (*jágrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti*), and draw important deductions from this distinction. The Upanishads of the *Atharvaveda*, specially the *Mándúkyā* and Gaurapáda's *Kárikā* thereon, speak of a fourth state, the *Chaturtha* or *Turíya*, and base an important doctrine on it. In fact it would scarcely be too much to say that the whole theology of the Upanishads, specially their doctrines of creation and liberation, are based on the distinctions referred to. Their interpretations of dreaming and dreamless sleep are sometimes quite correct, at any rate suggestive of deep truths. But sometimes they are misleading,—leading to errors that seem to have affected the spiritual lives of large sections of earnest but misguided devotees. It is important therefore that these errors should be seen and their evil consequences guarded against by all students and admirers of the Upanishads. Now, all that is said in my first lecture may be said to refer to the waking state of the soul. We have seen by what methods the *rishis* show unity in the infi-

nite diversity that characterises it. We have also seen that some of them do not see the distinction between difference as opposed to unity and difference as unopposed to and relative to unity, that at any rate some of their interpreters represent them as not recognising any distinction between these two kinds of difference. Now, the differences that characterise our waking state seem due to the presence of objects other than and independent of the knowing self. These objects seem either directly present to our knowing consciousness or to be the causes of sensations in us from which we infer their existence. Thus the light of intelligence which guides us in our activities seems to be a borrowed light. It seems to be the light of the sun, of the moon, of fire, lightning and other objects all conceived to be external to the mind. To show the error of this popular dualism the *rishis* of the Upanishads refer us to the state of dreaming sleep, in which the soul is admittedly alone,—cut off from communication with what are supposed to be external objects. They show, by what happens in this state, that the soul has a light of its own, a light which is not borrowed from any foreign reality, and that it has a power by which it produces objects seemingly but not really independent of it. The objects seen, heard, touched, tasted and smelt in the state of dreaming are just like those perceived in the waking state.

They seem as independent of the mind as so-called external objects and produce the same feelings of joy and sorrow, hope and fear, as the latter. If, then, the objects perceived in the dreaming state are creations of the mind itself and not the result of its contact with any external reality, why should not so-called external objects be considered to be equally dependent on the mind? The only characteristic that differentiates the objects perceived in the waking state from those perceived in the dreaming, is, so argue the composers and expounders of the Upanishads, their relative permanence; they are more permanent than the creations of dream. But their relative permanence is no argument for their externality. They are as relative to the mind as dreams. They constitute only a more lasting dream than what we call dreams, and as dreams prove to be creations of the mind on our re-waking from sleep, so do objects of the waking state prove to the enlightened soul when it has got rid of the sleep of ignorance in which ordinary unreflective people are sunk. So far the *rishis* and their interpreters seem to be all right. What they do not see, or do not see clearly, is the law and order that guide the appearance and disappearance, the forms and modifications, of objects perceived in the waking state,—a law and order which really constitutes the real though relative externality of the world,

its independence of individual life. The objects perceived by me—this particular individual—*here and now*, are the same as, or similar to, those perceived by *other* individuals and by me *there and then*,—at other places and times. Though therefore, as perceptions, they are essentially related to consciousness and have no meaning except as so related, they transcend the limitations of time, space and individuality. They are objective and not merely subjective. They are under an order—a conscious order no doubt—which does not depend on the local and momentary perceptions of individual minds. They are related to a universal and eternal Mind of which individual minds are only partial manifestations. This conclusion is indeed accepted and emphasised by the composers of the Upanishads; but the method by which they arrive at it seems often defective, and this defect seems due to their wrong reading of some of the phenomena of sleep. However, we shall return to the point and deal with it at greater length at a later stage of our discussion. Before we come to that, let us hear in the words of the *rishis* themselves what they have to say on sleep and its revelations. Of their many utterances on the subject, that of Yájñavalkya in the *Bṛihadárányaka*, Chapter IV, Sections 3 and 4, is the fullest and most important. Dr. Paul Deussen, the German Vedantist, calls this exposition

“incomparable.” We have already, in our first lecture, made our acquaintance with Yájnavalkya. He was King Janaka’s guide, friend and philosopher. In his colloquies with his patron and friend we find many personal touches which seem to point to two really historical persons and to a really remarkable friendship and fellowship of spirit. The first four *bráhmaṇas* of the fourth chapter of the *Bṛihadárányaka* are given to a dialogue, a long one, between these two philosophical friends. As we have seen in our account of Janaka’s great *yajna* or sacrifice in our first lecture, Yájnavalkya was very fond of cattle, a valuable property in those days, and even now where agriculture is the chief means of support. We find this fondness of Yájnavalkya touched upon in the very beginning of this long dialogue. We are told—“जनको ह वैदेह आसां चक्रे, अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्य आववाज । तं होवाच याज्ञवल्क्य किमर्थमचारीः पशून् इच्छन् अश्वत्थान् इति ? उभयमेव सम्वाङ् इति होवाच । यत् ते कश्चिद् अव्रवीत् तच्छृण्वाम इति ।”—

“As Janaka, king of the Videhas, was sitting, Yájnavalkya approached him and Janaka said to him, “Yájnavalkya, for what object do you come, wishing for cattle or for discussing subtle questions?” Yájnavalkya replied. “For both, Your Majesty. Let me hear what anybody may have told you.” Janaka mentioned to

him the opinions of six metaphysical thinkers, everyone of whom differed from the other. One of them identified Brahman with speech, another with life, a third with sight, a fourth with hearing, a fifth with the sensorium, and the sixth with हृदयम्, of which the correct translation seems to me in the light of other passages in the Upanishads 'understanding,' and not 'heart,' as Roer and Max Muller render it. Now, Yājñavalkya's criticism of those views is that though each of them represents an important aspect or manifestation of Brahman, they are all defective as only partial characterizations of him. The king, however, is so pleased with his teacher's appreciation and criticism of each of them, that at the end of every speech, he exclaims, "हस्त्येषमं सहस्रं ददामि"—"I shall give you a thousand cows with a bull as big as an elephant." But Yājñavalkya declines the tempting offer and says, "पिता मेऽमन्यत नाननुशिष्य हरेतेति"—"My father was of opinion that one should not accept a reward without having fully instructed a pupil." However, in the course of the exposition that follows, Yājñavalkya teaches his pupil to worship Brahman as knowledge, dear, true, endless, bliss and certainty—प्रज्ञा, प्रियम्, सत्यम्, अनन्त, आनन्द and स्थिति, so that when, at the end of the exposition and the beginning of the second brāhmaṇa Janaka comes down from

his throne, bows down to his teacher, and asks for further instruction, the latter says to the former,—“ Your Majesty, as a man who wishes to make a long journey would furnish himself with a chariot or ship, thus is your mind well-furnished by these Upanishads (that is the modes of worshipping Brahman just taught). You are honourable and wealthy, you have learnt the Vedas and been told the Upanishads. Whither then will you go when departing hence? ” Janaka replies, “ Sir, I do not know whither I shall go.” He is yet ignorant, according to our author and according to Yājñavalkya, of the manner in which the individual self passes away from the body and is united to the Universal. He has indeed no correct idea of the latter. Yājñavalkya therefore thinks it necessary to impart to his pupil some knowledge of Physiology, which, to modern scientists, would seem no Physiology at all, and then gives him a rather negative characterisation of the Universal Self, saying he is incomprehensible, undecaying, unattached, unbound, beyond suffering and imperishable. He then exclaims, “अभयं वै जनकं प्राप्तोसि”—“ O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness.” Janaka wishes him the same blessing and bowing down to him says :—“ Here are the Videhas and here am I (your slave; ” We are however really at the threshold of the real exposition, that of

dream and dreamless sleep, which is given in the third and fourth sections of the chapter. It begins with Janaka's query "किं ज्योतिरयं पुरुषः ?"—"What is the light of man?" Yājñavalkya's first answer is—"The sun," for it is with the help of sunlight that we move about and do our work. When the sun has set, it is the moon that guides us. In the absence of the moon it is the light of fire; when that also is wanting, it is sound that guides our movements. But when all these lights fail, what is it that forms our guide? Says Janaka to Yājñavalkya; "अस्तमित आदित्ये यान्नवल्का चन्द्रमसि अस्तमिते शान्तेऽग्नौ शान्तायां वाचि किं ज्योतिरिवायं पुरुष इति ।" "आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिर्भवति, आत्मनैवायं ज्योतषास्ते पल्लयते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येति इति ।"—"When the sun has set, O Yājñavalkya, and the moon has set, and fire is gone out, and sound is hushed, what is then the light of man?" Yājñavalkya said: "The self indeed is his light, for with the self as his light man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns." Now, in reply to Janaka's query "कतम आत्मा इति ?"—"Who is the self?" Yājñavalkya defines the self and distinguishes between its state of waking and those of dreaming and dreamless sleep. To him waking, with its duality of subject and object, cause and effect, is an illusory state and subject to destruction. It is a world of evils. The dream-

ing state is intermediate. In it the world of evils is partly transcended; the self shines by its own light, and has a foretaste, as it were, of unity. But it is yet connected with evil, that is duality. In dreamless sleep alone, which represents death, are all evils transcended and a state of perfect unity attained. Let us hear Yájnavalkya. He says : “योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः

पुरुषः स समानः सन् उभौ लोकावनुसंचरति ध्याय-
तीव लेलायतीव स हि स्वप्नो भूत्वा इमं लोकम्
अतिक्रामति मृत्यो रूपाणि । स वा अयं पुरुषो
जायमानः शरीरम् अभिसंपद्यमानः पाप्मभिः संसृज्यते,
स उत्क्रामन् म्रियमानः पाप्मनो विजहाति ।”—

“He who is within the heart, surrounded by the senses, the person of light, consisting of knowledge, he, remaining the same, wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving. During sleep he transcends this world and all the forms of death. On being born, that person, assuming his body, becomes united with all evils; when he departs and dies, he leaves all evils behind.” Yájnavalkya’s “ध्यायतीव, लेलायतीव” perhaps requires a little explanation. Our thinking and moving in the states of waking and dreaming are not real, according to him; they are only seeming, illusory. The self, in its real nature, neither thinks nor moves. However, our philosopher continues : “तस्य वा एतस्य पुरुषस्य हे एव स्थाने

भवत, इदं च परलोकस्थानं च, सन्ध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानं । तस्मिन् सन्ध्ये स्थाने तिष्ठन् एते उभे स्थाने पश्यति, इदं च परलोकस्थानं च । अथ यथाक्रमोऽयं परलोकस्थाने भवति तमाक्रमम् आक्रम्य उभयान् पाप्मन् आनन्दांश्च पश्यति । स यत्र प्रस्रपति अस्य लोकस्य सर्व्वावतो मात्रामपादाय स्वयं विहृत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा प्रस्रपिति, अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति ।”—

—“ And there are two states for that person, the one here in this world, the other in the other world, and as a third and intermediate state, the state of sleep. When in that intermediate state, he sees both these states together, the one here in this world, and the other in the other world. Now, whatever his admission to the other world may be, having gained that admission, he sees both the evils and the blessings. And when he falls asleep, then after having taken away with him the material from the whole world, destroying and building it up again, he sleeps (that is, dreams) by his own light. In that state the person is self-illuminated.” Then follows a beautiful description of the dreaming state, intended, as I have already said, to show the self’s power of creating differences out of itself :—“न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पत्न्यान् भवन्ति, अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते । न तत्रानन्दा मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्ति, अथानन्दान् मुदः प्रमुदः सृजते । न तत्र वैशान्ताः पुष्करिण्यः स्त्रवन्थो भवन्ति,

अथ वेशान्तान् पुष्करिणीः स्रवन्ती सृजते, स हि कर्त्ता ।”—

“There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings there, no happiness, no joys, but he himself creates blessings, happiness and joys. There are no tanks there, no lakes, no rivers, but he himself creates tanks, lakes and rivers. He indeed is the maker.” Now, King Janaka is so pleased with this exposition that he exclaims :—“सोऽहं

भगवते सहस्रं ददामि, अत ऊर्ध्वं विमोक्षाय ब्रूहीति ।”—

“I give you, Sir, a thousand cows. Speak on for the sake of my liberation.” I do not know, however, what price my hearers would set on this exposition or my exposition of this exposition. Times are much changed since Yājñavalkya spoke and Janaka appreciated and patronised him. But Philosophy, with or without an official stamp, has not ceased to be without a money value and without princely patrons even in these times. However, let us come to Yājñavalkya’s exposition of dreamless sleep, which to him represents the highest truth and the highest state of happiness. He speaks of this state in the following terms :—

तद् यथा अस्मिन् आकाशे श्येनो वा सुपर्णो वा विपरिपत्य
आन्तः संहृत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियते, एवम् एवायं पुरुष
एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कामं कामयते,

न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यति ।...तद्वा अस्य एतद् अतिच्छन्दा अप-
हतपाप्मा अभयं रूपम् ।...अयं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परि-
ष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेद नान्तरम् । तद्वा अस्य एतद्
आप्तकामम् आत्मकामम् अकामं रूपं शोकान्तरम् ।”—

“ As a falcon or any other swift bird, after it has roamed about in the air, becomes tired, and folding his wings is carried to his rest, so does the person hasten to that state where, when asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams. This person (*i.e.*, the individual self) when embraced by the supreme intelligent Self, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within. This indeed is his true form, in which his wishes are fulfilled, in which the self only is his wish, in which no wish is left, —free from any sorrow.”

It is besides a state of unity without difference, —one in which all distinctions, natural and moral, are lost. As Yājñavalkya says :—“अत्र पिता अपिता भवति, माता अमाता, लोका अलोकाः, देवा अदेवाः, वेदा अवेदाः । अत्र स्तेनो अस्तेनो भवति, भूणहा अभूणहा, चण्डालो अचण्डालः, पौलकसो अपौलकसः, अमणो अश्रमण स्तापस अतापसः, अनन्वागतं पुण्येन, अनन्वागतं पापेन तीर्णोहि तदा सर्व्वाञ्छोकान् हृदयस्य भवति ।”—

“Then a father is not a father, a mother not a mother, the worlds not worlds, the gods not gods, the Vedas not Vedas. There a thief is not

a thief, a murderer is not a murderer, a Chandála not a Chandála, a Paulkasa (*i.e.*, a low caste man, the son of a Súdra father and a Kshatriya mother) not a Paulkasa, a mendicant not a mendicant, an ascetic not an ascetic. He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart." But the question arises, If the state of dreamless sleep is without any duality, without any difference, and if that is the self's true form, does it not then cease to see, hear, touch, taste and smell—cease in short to know, and if so, how can it be called *vijnánamaya* (consisting of knowledge, and *prájna* (the supremely intelligent) and so on? Our philosopher is here in a real difficulty, but he comes out of it in his own way. His solution of the problem is that the power of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, in short that of knowing, being inseparable from the self, is imperishable and therefore remains in it in the state represented by dreamless sleep. Though therefore it cannot be said that in this state the self sees and knows, in the sense that an object different from it comes before it, yet it may and must be said to be seeing, knowing. Yájñavalkya expounds this doctrine in eight passages, all similarly worded, and speaks one after another of seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching and knowing. I shall extract only the first and last of these

passages. He says :—“यद्वै तन् न पश्यति, पश्यन् वै तन् न पश्यति, न हि द्रष्टृर्दृष्टे विपरिलोपो विद्यते, अविनाशित्वात् । न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद् विभक्तं यत् पश्येत् । यद् वै तन् न विजानाति, विजानन् वै तन् न विजानाति, न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञाते विपरिलोपो विद्यते, अविनाशित्वात् । न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद् विभक्तं यद् विजानीयात् ।—“ And when there (*i.e.*, in dreamless sleep) though it seems that he does not see, yet really he is seeing, though he does not see. For sight is inseparable from the seer, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him, that he could see. And when there, though it seems that he does not know, yet really he is knowing, though he does not know. For knowing is inseparable from the knower, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him, that he could know.”

Now, passages like these may be said to solve or not to solve the problem accordingly as we interpret them one way or the other. Those of you who heard my last lecture on the Upanishads must remember that at the end of my exposition of the ‘Maitreyí Bráhmaṇa,’ that is the dialogue between Yájñavalkya and his wife Maitreyí, I said that his doctrine of immortality admitted of a double interpretation accordingly as we un-

derstood his Idealism as a system of Absolute Monism, a doctrine of unity without difference, or one of Qualified Monism, a doctrine of unity-in-difference. I also said that even if Yájnavalkya was taken as teaching Absolute Monism and as its logical corollary the final merging of the individual in the universal Self, there were other *rishis* of the Upanishads who did not teach that doctrine, but who taught rather one of unity-in-difference. I mentioned and expounded at some length the ' Indra-Pratardana-Sambáda ' of the *Kaushítaki Upanishad* as a clear and unmistakable instance. I postponed an interpretation of Yájnavalkya's teaching on immortality till I had thrown on it the light of his exposition of the three states of the self, the waking, the dreaming, and dreamless sleep, in his colloquy with King Janaka. I have now done so, and I now ask you to consider in which of the two ways mentioned Yájnavalkya's doctrine ought to be interpreted. The usual Monistic interpretation is indeed evident, and that is that in the state of dreamless sleep, which, according to Yájnavalkya, represents the true and ultimate nature of the self, that is of the highest Self, the Paramátman, and which represents also the condition which the individual self will attain in *pará mukti*, absolute liberation, the self retains knowledge only as a power and not as a fact, and that in that condition the duality of subject and object, not only as a real

but even as an apparent opposition, is non-existent. In other words, not only difference as opposed to unity, *svajātiya* and *vijātiya bheda*, but also difference-in-unity, *svagata bheda*, does not exist in it. Now, it is quite conceivable that Yājñavalkya meant his words to convey this meaning and that he did not see the inconsistencies involved in his doctrine as thus interpreted. But it is also conceivable that he did not mean all this and that by emphasising the ultimate unity of the self he meant only to show the popular error of believing in two independent entities, matter and soul, and in finite souls independent of the Infinite, and not to deny that there is a unity not opposed to but in harmony with difference, and that this unity-in-difference is the real nature of the highest Self and also represents the relation in which we, individual selves, really stand to him in spite of our errors on the subject, and will continue to stand to him when all our errors are gone,—“यदा सर्वे प्रभियन्ते हृदयस्येह यन्मयः”; in his own words. But what Yājñavalkya meant by his words is a matter of comparative indifference to me, and ought to be to you all. What is important to us all is that the falseness and inconsistency of the doctrine, as just stated, should be seen by us, and with your leave I proceed to show this. Seeing, hearing, thinking, knowing and so on, as mere powers, without objects seen, heard, thought and known, are mere abstrac-

tions, and a self with these powers and without any objects related to them is itself an abstraction. Such abstractions are indeed a part of ordinary unphilosophical thought, but this does not any the less make them abstractions and nothing more. We habitually speak of our becoming utterly unconscious, at any rate unconscious of objects, in sound sleep and becoming conscious again in re-waking, without being aware of the self-contradiction of which we thus become guilty. But nevertheless there is actual contradiction in such thinking. Subject and object, as I showed in my last lecture, are correlatives, and knowledge is the relating principle. Knowledge is impossible without both sides of this relation, and where there is no knowledge there can be neither subject nor object. If this is true, there cannot be a self without a knowledge of objects as there cannot be a knowledge of objects without a self. Dreamless sleep, therefore, a state in which there is a self, but the self knows no objects, is an impossibility. That it appears to be a fact in actual experience, is due to a wrong interpretation of experience. A proper interpretation of re-waking,—of the re-appearance, in individual experience, of the knowledge of objects after it has been submerged in sound sleep, shows that the individual or finite form of knowledge is not its only form, but that it has a higher, more lasting, in fact an eternal, form.

In other words the individual, the finite, is not sufficient for itself, it is not independent, but is relative to and dependent on the Universal and Infinite. In fact it is in itself an abstraction, a relative moment only, of concrete reality. In a few hours after your present experience, your seeing this hall with the various objects in it, and your hearing my words, you will fall into sleep, sound and dreamless sleep, let me hope, and forget everything you have seen and heard. The self in you will retain,—if Yájnavalkya is right and the interpretation just put on his words is correct,—only *powers* of seeing and hearing, and not any actual knowledge of objects. The knowledge of objects then, according to the supposition, will be totally gone, for it is a contradiction to say that knowledge can exist anywhere but in an actual knower, in one who actually knows. But behold, as you re-awake after your sleep, the knowledge of objects supposed to have been lost comes back to you. You recognise that it is *your* knowledge—*your* seeing these objects, *your* hearing these words—which has come back. In fact it is *you, as the knower of these objects*, who were submerged and who have risen again. The submergence was therefore not an actual loss. If it were a loss, there could not be this re-appearance. It is only what exists that can rise or appear again. And the knowledge of objects can exist only as such, only

as *knowledge* of objects, only as actually existing in an actual knower, in the relation of subject and object, and not as a mere power of knowing. The self in you therefore has another form, another aspect, of which you little think,—a form or aspect in which it never sleeps, never loses its knowledge—knowledge either of itself or of the objects related to it. In other words the finite self, the self subject to sleep, oblivion and ignorance, is related to an Infinite Self which is ever-wakeful, never-forgetting, an all-knowing Self without whose infinite and perfect life our limited life would be impossible. Either then Yájnavalkya is wrong or the interpretation usually put upon his exposition of sleep is incorrect. Dreamless sleep, in which all actual knowledge is lost and only the power of knowing retained, may be attributed to the finite individual self, but that self is not sufficient for itself, and its waking and sleeping, its coming to know and ceasing to know, do not fully represent actual and concrete reality. They are only appearances representing one aspect of reality. They must be supplemented by the other aspect. The sleeping, forgetting self,—the self that comes to know and ceases to know,—has a meaning only in relation to One who knows eternally, fully, knows all—all related facts—in one undivided grasp of immediate vision.

Now, before I show that this difference bet-

when the finite and the Infinite self was clearly seen by other *rishis* of the Upanishads—*rishis* other than Yájnavalkya—and that they did not accept the usual monistic interpretation of dreamless sleep, I shall briefly indicate to what conclusion about the ultimate goal of the soul it led Yájnavalkya, or, at any rate, his monistic interpreters. Consistently carried out, the doctrine ought to lead to what Yájnavalkya teaches Maitreyí about death—“न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति”—“There is no knowledge after death,” and should not be saddled by any teaching about re-incarnation and transmigration. But Yájnavalkya does so saddle it. He has a doctrine of desire which leads him to a doctrine of re-births and their ultimate cessation. Though he defines dreamless sleep as a state in which the self “न कंचन कामं कामयते,”—“desires no desires”—yet he thinks that in the soul not fully liberated the seeds of desire remain, and that if a man dies with such seeds in him, they will lead him to constant re-births either in this or in other worlds, and the quality of the shapes assumed, and of the worlds inhabited, by him will be determined by the nature of the deeds done, of the desires desired, by him here. The fruits of desire, however, according to Yájnavalkya and other teachers in the Upanishads, have no permanence. They are, like a heap of laid up mo-

ney, exhausted by enjoyment and must sooner or later lead to bankruptcy and to the descent of the soul to this world. But, says Yájnavalkya, —“इति नु कामयमानः अथ अकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकामो, न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति” ।—“So much for the man who desires. But as to the man who does not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere,—being Brahman, he goes to Brahman.” Sankara and other unqualified Monists interpret this going to Brahman as the attainment of a state of unity without difference typified in dreamless sleep. And we can hardly blame them for such an interpretation, for we have seen that Yájnavalkya regards *sushupti* as representing the true nature of the self and as a state of perfect bliss. But there is another side of the shield and to that we now turn.

We have seen in our first lecture the doctrine of unity-in-difference as it is expounded in the Indra-Pratardana-Sambáda of the *Kaushítaki Upanishad*, and the corollary to which it leads, the translation of the finite soul to the Brahmaloka and its dwelling there in unity-in-difference with the Infinite and in the company of other liberated souls. We shall now turn to the *Chhán-Upanishad* and see in its Indra-Prajápati-

Sambáda the exposition of a fourth state of the soul, elsewhere called the *Turiya*, and the corollary to which this exposition leads—one similar to the teaching of the *Kaushítaki Upanishad* on immortality. The Indra-Prajápati-Sambáda is contained in sections 7-2, of the eighth chapter of the *Chhándogya Upanishad*. The story is briefly this:—Both the *devas* and the *asuras* heard that Prajápati, the first embodied being, the progenitor of all creatures, was teaching the

following doctrine:—“य आत्मा अपहृतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघत्सो अपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः सर्व्वींश्च लोकान् आप्नोति सर्व्वींश्च कामान् यस्तम् आत्मानम् अनुविद्य विजानाति इति ।”—“The Self which is free from evil, undecaying, undying, free from sorrow, free from hunger and thirst, with true desires, true volitions,—that is what one must seek after and wish to understand. One who has sought after this Self and understands it, obtains all worlds and all desires.” The gods and the demons were both attracted by the report of this teaching and wished to make it their own. The former sent Indra and the latter Virochana to take lessons from the great teacher. They are said to have dwelt with him as *Brahmacháris* thirty-two years before he so much as asked them with what end in view they

had enlisted themselves as his pupils. When he learned their purpose—that of knowing the true self—Prajápati said, “य एषो अक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मा”—“The person that is seen in the eye, that is the self.” His pupils of course misunderstood him. They understood him as saying that the body as reflected in the form of an image, and not the seer, was the self. He corrected them by saying, “It is he who is perceived within all these.” They did not understand him even then. He told them to clean and adorn themselves, to put on their best clothes, and then to look at themselves in a pan of water. They did so and Prajápati again said to them that what they saw was their self. Then both of them went away satisfied in their hearts. Virochana went to the *asuras* and taught them that the true self was the body and that their true good consisted in adorning it and making it comfortable. The Upanishad says that this is the true *asura* doctrine whether held by men or demons. Indra, however, was not so easily contented. Before he had returned to the Devaloka he saw the difficulty in the doctrine which he had learned from Prajápati or rather the way in which he had understood it in its first enunciation. He saw that if the soul and the body were the same, the soul must be subject to all the evils which flesh is heir to and that this doctrine could not be the one

which had been originally reported to him. He therefore returned to the teacher and laid his difficulty before him. Prajapati told him to live with him another thirty-two years before he could give him further instruction on the self. At the end of this period Prajapati taught him the doctrine that the self in its dreaming state was the true self. Indra went away apparently satisfied, but he again came back with a difficulty similar to his first. He saw that the dreaming state was subject to evils similar to those experienced in the waking state. His teacher told him to live with him another thirty-two years, at the end of which Prajapati taught him the doctrine which might have satisfied Yájñavalkya, which, at any rate, does satisfy the advocates of unqualified Monism. It is the doctrine that the true nature of the self is represented by dreamless sleep. As before, Indra goes away apparently satisfied, but soon comes back. He sees the same difficulty in the doctrine which we see and which has led me to the criticism of it I have already offered. Indra truly says of a person in dreamless sleep : —“न ह खलु अयम् एवं सम्प्रति आत्मानं जानाति ‘अयम् अहम् अस्मि’ इति, नो एव इमानि भूतानि, विनाशम् एव अपीतो भवति, नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामि”—

“ In truth he does not in this condition know himself as ‘ This is I ’ nor does he know these other things ; therefore he has reached ut-

ter annihilation. I see no good in this doctrine." Prajapati saw that Indra was nearly prepared to understand the true doctrine and so told him to live with him for only five years more, thus completing a hundred and one years of his period of pupilage. What Prajapati teaches him at the end of this period labours under imperfect forms of expression and inapt image-ries. But the distinction which he draws between the body and the true self is clear enough. The eye, the nose, the tongue are, he says, not the true self, but only its instruments, the true self being he who uses these instruments. His divine eye—"दैवं चक्षुः"—is the mind with which he sees all things when free from the body. "एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीराद् उत्थाय परं ज्योतिरूपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेण अभिनिष्यद्यते ।"—"Rising from this body; this serene being reaches the highest light and appears in its own form." Nothing is said here of the individual self merging in Brahman. Of Brahman or the true Self as taught by Prajapati it is said :— "य एते ब्रह्मलोके तं वा एतं देवा आत्मानम् उपासते"— "The *devas* who are in the world of Brahman worship that Self." "तस्मात् तेषां सर्वे च लोका आप्ताः सर्वे च कामाः । स सर्वांश्च लोकान् आप्नोति सर्वांश्च कामान् यस्तम् आत्मानं अनुविद्य विजानाति ।"—

“Therefore all worlds belong to them and all desires. He who knows that Self and understands it obtains all worlds and all desires.” Here the Indra-Prajápati-Sambáda ends, and three little sections hence the *Chhándogya Upanishad* itself ends, with not the slightest mention of the doctrine of a unity without difference or our final merging in it. The last section of the book gives a brief summary of life from *Brahmacharya* to the attainment of the Brahmaloka—a summary in which there is no room either for *sanyása*, the Monist’s earthly goal, or merging in an undifferentenced unity, his heavenly goal. The closing sentence of the Upanishad is this,—

स खलु एवं वर्त्तयन् यावद् आयुषं ब्रह्मलोकम् अभि-
सम्पद्यते, न च पुनर् आवर्त्तते, न च पुनर् आवर्त्तते।”

“He who behaves thus all his life, reaches the world of Brahman and does not return, yea, he does not return.” We have just seen, as we saw in the case of the *Kaushítaki Upanishad*, that the *Chhándogya*’s Brahmaloka is a world of differences. The *devas* are there, worshipping the true Self and rejoicing in company. It is a social world with a central unity. It is not a world without differences and without desires, as the Monist’s goal is. We are expressly told that in this condition all worlds and all desires are at the soul’s command.

The Upanishads, then, at any rate some of

them, notably the *Chhándogya* and the *Kaushítaki*, teach in the clearest manner the doctrine of a personal God, without which there cannot be, I think, any religion worthy of the name. I need not refer at any length to those which teach the opposite doctrine. The Upanishads of the *Atharvaveda*—the *Prasna*, *Mundaka* and *Mándúkyā*—seem to teach it, though not with the same clearness as the *Brihadáranyaka*. As later productions, they must have derived it from the latter. They are however less consistent than their original authority inasmuch as they, though recognising a fourth state of the self like the *Chhándogya*, do not yet admit clearly, as the *Chhándogya* does, that this state is one of unity-in-difference. However, let us now see how much is implied, nay even explicitly recognised, by the Upanishads in this doctrine of a personal God. As we have already seen, it implies a distinction, clear and undeniable, between the Infinite and the finite self. The Infinite is ever-waking and omniscient, while the finite is subject to sleep and oblivion. The Infinite is all-comprehensive, containing in him the innumerable differences of the world, while the finite contains only a part of the world. The differences of the universe actually exist in the Infinite as differences in a unity, and not as mere powers of producing them, for, as we have seen, mere powers without their products are abstractions. *Máyá*, conceived as a mere power of pro-

ducing illusory appearances, is a mere abstraction, as much as a subject without objects. Finite intelligences, then, must be conceived as existing eternally in their finitude, in their difference from one another, in the Infinite. That they are so retained in their hours of oblivion, sleep and unconsciousness, we see in every instance of their returning memory, re-awakening from sleep and revival of consciousness after temporary subsidence. It may be difficult for us to comprehend how the finite finds a place in the Infinite and yet does not get totally merged in it, and how again the Infinite reproduces itself in the finite and yet continues to be Infinite. It may even be impossible for the finite, the creature, to fully comprehend all this. But facts are facts and must have a place in our philosophy. The individual and Universal, then, are distinct from, though at the same time one with, each other. They are objects of each other's knowledge. That the individual knows the Universal—that he makes him the object of his search, his thought and meditation, is quite evident. That the individual in its turn is the object of the Universal's thought, is also evident from the fact that he, the Universal, is a knowing Person and not an undifferented consciousness and that the individual's limitations—even his errors and defects—are contained in him, and are reproduced by him after their apparent submergence

in sleep and oblivion,—reproduced just as they were in his conscious and waking state. The Infinite holds them, but is not affected by them. Our ignorance and mistakes are ours only, and do not touch ultimate reality. Facts are what they are, and are not altered by our inability to comprehend them rightly. In the same manner our evil thoughts and purposes do not alter the true good. Our unjust and unkind thoughts and acts leave justice and kindness virtues all the same. But though our errors and defects are only ours, and not God's, they yet cease at times to be objects of our consciousness. They drop down into the 'subconscious' region. The idea of such a region, however, is an abstraction, as we have already seen. It is real only in relation to the eternal Consciousness. By starting up again into our finite consciousness our mental possessions show that they were all the while in the eternal Consciousness and not in an unconscious region. We thus see that we are never absent from the infinite Mind. Again, we love the Infinite. Yájnavalkya himself, who is interpreted as favouring the idea of an impersonal God, has said, as we have seen, very beautiful things on our love of the true Self. And our love, as our bliss and knowledge, is only a particle of the divine love. “एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्राम् उपजीवन्ति”—“Other beings en-

joy only a particle of his bliss.” And the Infinite is an object of our will—an object which we are to realise with constant endeavours. The Upanishads lay down an elaborate scheme for the practical realisation of the Infinite. The Upanishadic God, then, is a Person related to persons. His relations to us are not mere metaphysical, but also moral relations. But I must admit that our moral relations to God are not treated of with anything like the fulness with which metaphysical questions are dealt with in the premier Upanishads, the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and the *Chhândogya*, though the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, in its ‘Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa,’ gives the real clue to such treatment. We have to look for a fuller treatment of the subject in the smaller metrical Upanishads—the *Katha*, the *Mundaka* and the *Svetāsvatara*. The last-named Upanishad is the one in which the personal attributes of God—his moral relations with individual souls—find the fullest recognition. But the subject is a vast one, specially as it must be treated of with reference to the ethical ideas of the Upanishads. I must therefore reserve it for a third lecture. Meanwhile let us close with a prayer from the Upanishad just named :

“या ते रुद्र शिवा तनूर्घोरापापकाशिनी ।

तया नस्तनुवा शन्तमया गिरिशन्ताभिचाकशीहि ॥

अजात इत्येवं कश्चिद् मीरः प्रतिपद्यते ।

रुद्र यत्ते दक्षिणं मुखं तेन मां पाहि नित्यम् ॥”

—“ O Rudra, who livest in our mountain and spreadest happiness, look upon us with that benign form of thine which is auspicious and shorn of terror, and which imparts holiness. ‘Thou art eternal’—with these words I, who am in terror, take refuge in thee. O Rudra, protect me ever with that auspicious face of thine.

शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः । हरिः ॐ ।

LECTURE III

ETHICAL AND EMOTIONAL RELIGION IN THE UPANISHADS

The *Kathopanishad* attached to the *Krishna Yajurveda* opens with a parable—an allegorical representation of a spiritual truth. A rich Bráhmāna named Vājasravasa is said to have performed a *yajna*, a sacrifice, in which he gave away, or was expected to give away according to the rules of the sacrifice, the whole of his property. The commentators say it was the *visvajit yajna*. But the sacrificer seems to have undertaken the rite half-heartedly, without proper faith in its sacredness. For the gifts he offered to his priests were not fit for the occasion, not fit indeed to be given to any one. They consisted of cows which were incapable of giving milk, incapable of producing calves, incapable, it is said, even of eating and drinking. The mock character of the whole performance struck the simple heart, unspoilt by hypocrisy and worldly prudence, of the sacrificer's young son, Nachiketá. Nachiketas or Nachiketá, I may point out by the way, is an epithet of Agni, the god of fire. Now, when Nachiketá looked at the mockery of a *visvajit yajna*, अज्ञा or आस्तिक्य बुद्धि, faith in the reality of supersensuous things, entered his

heart. He, for one, had not lost faith either in the sacredness of a sacrifice or in the reality of its fruits, of the happy result of one properly performed and the evil effects of one performed without faith. He thought :

पीतोदका जग्धतृणा दुग्धदोहा निरिन्द्रियाः ।

अनन्दा नाम ते लोकास्तान् स गच्छति ता ददत् ॥

—“ A man who gives away cows unable to drink water, eat grass, yield milk and produce offspring, surely goes to joyless regions.” He honestly thought what he had been taught to believe, and thinking too that he who, according to the ideas of the time, was a part of his father’s property, ought to be given away to one of the priests consistently with the rules of the sacrifice, asked his father to which of his priests he was going to make a present of him. Vájasravasa of course had no mind to part with his boy and gave no reply to his childish prattle, till, enraged by the boy’s repetition of this foolish question three times, he said, “ मृत्यवे त्वा ददामि ” —“ I will give you to the god of death.” The boy took these words seriously and fearing lest his father might not keep his promise, appealed to him in the name of truthful people, past and present, and pressed him to be true to his words. Vájasravasa had to yield and send the boy to Yama’s abode. Yama, however, was not at home

and there was no one there to receive the guest. This seems rather strange. That the domestic arrangements of such a great potentate as the god of death should be so unsatisfactory, is incredible and calls for an explanation. But our poet offers no explanation of the anomaly. However, when the god returns and finds that a guest has lived in his house three days without any reception being accorded to him, he is very sorry and even afraid lest this neglect of a Bráhmaṇa might bring untold calamities upon him and his family. All this seems to point to a comparatively late origin of the poem, to a time when the sanctity of the Bráhmaṇa caste had been seriously questioned and had thus to be particularly emphasised. However, as a compensation for this neglect, though unintentional, the god promised three boons to his young guest,—boons which he was told he might choose for himself. The first boon chosen by Nachiketá was that his father should be free from anger at his coming to death's abode against his wishes and free from anxiety for him, and that when he should return to the earth after his sojourn in the nether regions, his father should recognise him as his son and welcome him back. It was a natural prayer worthy of a loving and reverent son, and was immediately granted. The second boon was instruction in the mode of producing the sacrificial fire and of keeping it burning,—the fire

which, through the libations offered to it, was believed to be the means of reaching the heavenly regions. This boon also was gladly granted. Nachiketá might stop here. Most people, specially young people, with the sure prospect of gaining everything which they desire, but the vanity of which they have not experienced, would stop here. But Nachiketá did not stop. He asked for a third boon, the most important of the three, and that was a decisive answer to the question whether the soul is immortal or not. Now, far from readily granting this boon, as he had done the first two, Yama tried his best to dissuade his guest from pressing this question upon him and to persuade him to ask for another boon. This part of the story is very interesting and also very important for our purpose, and I shall put it in the form of a dialogue between Yama and Nachiketá. It is, in a manner, given in this form in our Upanishad, and I do little more than give it an English garb.

Yama said, "The question you ask, Nachiketá, is one concerning which the gods themselves formerly entertained doubts. The subject is very abstruse and cannot be easily understood. Ask some other question and do not press this."

Nachiketá: "I know that the gods formerly had doubts about the matter, and you too say that it cannot be easily understood. But on the other hand I cannot find a teacher of the subject

as competent as you. I therefore think that I cannot choose a better boon than this."

Yama : " Better ask for children and grandchildren each living a hundred years. Ask for numerous cattle, horses and elephants. Ask for a kingdom occupying a large part of the earth. Ask for a life of as many autumns as you like. Ask for ample property and provision for your whole life. Be an emperor, and I shall give you all objects of desire. Things that are rare on earth, you get here for the mere asking. Look at these beautiful nymphs, mounted on chariots and with musical instruments in their hands. You cannot see such among men. If you please, I shall bid them attend on you. Do not press your question about death."

Nachiketá : " O god of death, the things you speak of are to-day, but will not be to-morrow. And they waste the powers of those who enjoy them. Even a life lasting for a whole cycle may be said to be transient. I therefore do not covet your horses and your songs and dances. Man's heart cannot be satisfied by wealth—'न विस्तेन तर्पनीयो मनुष्यः' । You may give me as much wealth and as long a life as it is in your power to give, but the boon I ask for is the one I have already mentioned. I am an earthly mortal subject to decay, but I stand before immortals who are above decay. I know that I can get from you things higher than the transient pleasures arising

from love and beauty. How can I be so foolish as to ask for a mere long life on earth? I know that if I obtain the boon I ask for, I shall be able to enter into the mysteries of the life everlasting. I therefore ask for no other boon than that."

The god of death was quite satisfied. He saw that Nachiketá was fit for discipleship, quite competent to receive instruction in the science of sciences—the science of the spirit. Mere understanding is not enough for the comprehension of that science, "नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया" । A certain insight, imperfect no doubt at the beginning, into non-sensuous realities, must be gained before instruction can fairly begin. At any rate, a certain liking for things eternal, even though they are only heard of and not actually known, must arise in the heart, and this is impossible so long as it is full of the love of earthly things.

न साम्परायः प्रतिभाति बालम्

प्रमाद्यन्तं वित्तमोहेन मूढम् ।

—"The hereafter is not revealed to a thoughtless fool deluded by the charms of wealth." One of the things which most successfully removes this charm is contact with death, either the death of some dear and near one or our own death staring us in the face through some threatening disease. Nachiketá is only the natural man enjoying earthly things and practising the ceremonial religion consisting in fire-sacrifices

and seeking other-worldly things through them, but suddenly discovering on standing face to face with death that there are higher things to be sought and obtained, things which, in their transcendent value, bear no comparison with worldly and other-worldly things. However, to resume the thread of our story, Yama pays a glowing compliment to Nachiketá for his choice, for his rejecting the offer of so many tempting things and sticking to his resolution of learning the highest truth. This compliment need not detain us. Yama's instruction itself is the thing that concerns us, and no part of this instruction is more important than the beginning. Yama begins with a sharp distinction between *प्रेयः* and *श्रेयः*, the pleasant and the good, the desired and the desirable, that which the natural man actually desires and that which man, when enlightenment dawns upon him, feels that he ought to desire. The former Yama significantly calls *avidyá*, ignorance, and the latter *vidyá*, wisdom. *Sreyah* and *preyah*, he says, both approach man, and want him, as it were, to make his choice, to choose either the one or the other. The wise man discriminates between them and chooses *sreyah*, while the fool chooses *preyah* through greed and avarice. It is most important that the distinction between *sreyah* and *preyah*, the good and the pleasant, the truly desirable and that which is merely desired,

should be clearly grasped, and also the nature of the freedom which makes us resist the seductions of *preyah* and choose *sreyah* inspite of its plain and sometimes even rough and forbidding exterior. It is this felt distinction and the free choice that reduces this feeling to action which distinguish man from beasts, the natural man from the spiritual, the *súdra* or once-born from the *dvija* or twice-born. A confusion of *preyah* with *sreyah* and of *sreyah* with *preyah* is fatal to the spiritual life, and if life begins and proceeds a long way with the confusion uncorrected, the correction may never come in this life, and life may be utterly ruined inspite of immense resources, economical and intellectual. It may be that there is a unity in the difference, an arch bridging the opposed sides or aspects of life, but the opposition is nevertheless real, and must be seen before the harmony can be clearly grasped. It may be that what is only *preyah* at first, only pleasant and thus attractive, is at last seen to be also *sreyah*, good, desirable, worthy of being sought. It may also be that what at first seems only *sreyah*, good, desirable, though not pleasant or actually desired, at last becomes *preyah*, actually pleasant. But nevertheless the opposition or antithesis must at first be felt and the transition made from the one side to the other. Wealth, honour, and the various objects of sense, which are at first sought only as pleasure-giving

objects, may, by a growth in true wisdom, be at last seen to be not opposed, but contributive, to the higher life, and thus become objects of search ; but the higher life to which they are thus seen to be helps must at first be seen to be something very different from a life of pleasure-seeking, and it must also be seen that these things, conceived as parts or auxiliaries of the higher life, are not exactly the same things as they are when sought merely as sources of pleasure,—that a real and even a radical transformation has taken place in them. In the same manner, though the higher life, the life of *sreyah*, the pursuit of truth, justice, kindness, admiration and reverence, may ultimately become itself pleasant, this pleasantness is radically different from the pleasure sought by the sensualist and the epicurean, and would be impossible without the heroic and self-denying rejection of pleasure implied in the pursuit of *sreyah*. The antithesis therefore is real inspite of the underlying synthesis and must be seen and gone through. However, what is *sreyah*, the good, which Yama thus distinguishes from *preyah*, the pleasant? It is the realisation, both intellectual and practical, of the truth that the essence, the truth, the Self, of the world and the true and inner self of man is a Being infinitely wise and good, free from all limitations, metaphysical and moral. We have seen in our first

two lectures how, through what meditations, the Upanishads, specially the *Chhándogya*, the *Brihadáranyaka* and the *Kaushítaki*, rise to a knowledge of the Infinite Being. The smaller Upanishads, most of which are metrical, lack the diffuseness and comparative fulness of the larger prose Upanishads and teach the doctrine of Brahman in verses which, though often very beautiful, are characterised by great brevity. They however bring out more clearly the personality of God, his moral attributes and our ethical relations and duties to him. Of these relations and duties there is one which ordinary religionists, specially those under Vaishnava and Christian influences, would hardly recognise as ethical, but which is really so, and is deeply emphasised by the Upanishads, both the larger prose ones and the smaller metrical ones. It is God's relation to us as our true Self and the Self of the world, and as such the object of our knowledge, and our duty of knowing him as such and realising his presence through deep meditation. Ordinary religion does not know and conceive God as such and thus does not recognise this supreme duty. It is contented with believing in him as the Creator, the first Cause, of man and the world. The peculiarity and the transcendent value of the religion of the Upanishads lies in its profound insight into the truth of the essential unity of God on the one hand and man and the world on the

other, its recognition of the fact that man in his natural condition, unillumined by true wisdom, lives in habitual ignorance of this unity, and its teaching, in various ways and forms, that there is no salvation for man unless he overcomes this ignorance and lives in the constant consciousness of God within and without. I call this ideal, and the *sādhana*s or exercises prescribed for its realisation, ethical, because they imply a difference, a distinction, between God and man, and not mere unity, as is wrongly supposed by those who do not understand the religion of the Upanishads. If God and man were absolutely one, without any difference, there would not be the relation of the known and the knower between them and it would not be man's duty to know God more and more fully and endeavour to live constantly in conscious presence of him. Neither would there be any meaning or anything divine in God's revelation of himself to man. But really man as created is distinct from God, and God does reveal himself to him as his Creator, his Source, his true Self. As the Upanishad we are this moment considering, the *Katha*; says :—

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो

न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्य-

स्तस्यैष आत्मा वृणुते तनूं स्वाम् ॥ २ । २३ ।

—“ This Self cannot be gained by studying the Vedas, nor by understanding nor by learning. It is gained by him alone whom it chooses for self-revelation. To him this Self manifests its own body or nature.” However, the ethical nature of this *sādhana*,—of *darsana* (seeing God) and of its helps, *sravana*, hearing or study, *manana*, thinking, and *nididhyāsana*, deep meditation,—being seen, it must also be seen that this duty is not a mere intellectual one, but has an emotional aspect. Everywhere in the Upanishads the realisation of God is described as a state of deep and intense joy, and in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Taittirīya* Upanishads many joyous conditions of life are imagined and described as representing only fractions of the joy of him who lives in conscious communion with Brahman. Again, life in God is described as a state of love and holiness. As the *Isopanishad* says :

यसु सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यति ।

सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते ॥ ६ ।

—“ He who sees everything in the Self and the Self in everything, hence hates no one.” And as the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* says : “तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिष्ठुः समाहितो भूत्वाऽत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति, नैनं पाप्मा तरति, सर्वं पाप्मानं तरति, नैनं पाप्मा तपति, सर्वं पाप्मानं तपति, विपापो विरजो विचिकित्सो ब्राह्मणो भवति,

एष ब्रह्मलोकः ।” —“ Therefore he who knows this becomes calm, subdued, free from desire, enduring, composed in mind, and sees the Self in himself and all things as the Self. Sin does not subdue him, he subdues sin. Sin does not overcome him, he overcomes sin. He becomes free from sin, free from desire, free from doubt, a (real) Bráhmāna. This is the world of Brahman.” (IV. 4. 23).

Thus the supreme duty of knowing God, of seeing him and living constantly in his presence, though apparently a purely intellectual one when looked at superficially, takes an emotional and practical form when it is seriously taken up. *Jñāna*, knowledge, in its deeper and fuller form, becomes *prema* and *pūṇya*, love and holiness, and thus our duty to God becomes three-fold, knowing him, loving him and doing his will, or rather, to speak in the spirit of the Upanishads, being assimilated to him in nature,—“ब्रह्मभूतः” । The Upanishads are very sparing in injunctions, specially injunctions to cultivate love and holiness, and that is because they address themselves to inquirers who are supposed to have passed through a preliminary course of ethical discipline and reverential performance of religious duties. But I may as well extract a passage, one often quoted, from the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, which tells us to worship the Supreme Self with love, a passage to

which I shall refer later on in another connection. It is as follows :—“तदेतत् प्रेयः पुत्रात् प्रेयो वित्तात् प्रेयोऽन्यस्मात् सर्वस्मादन्तरतरं यदयमात्मा । स योऽन्यमात्मानं प्रियं ब्रुवानं ब्रुयात् प्रियं रोत्स्यतीतीश्वरो तथैव स्याद्, आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपासीत । य आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपास्ते न ह्यस्य प्रियं प्रमायुक्तं भवति ।”

That is, “It is dearer than son, dearer than riches, dearer than all others. If anyone says to another who pronounces any other thing to be dearer than the Self, ‘What is dear to you will perish,’ he is quite competent to say so, for what he says is true. One should worship the Self alone as dear. Of him who worships the Self alone as dear, the dear thing never perishes.”

(i.4.8) I need hardly stop here to point out that the Self which we are here commanded to love is not our finite individuality as such, but the Infinite in us, the *Bhúman*, which is our true Self and which alone is blissful. I showed this at some length in my first lecture, in speaking of Yájñavalkya’s colloquy with Maitreyí and of Sanatkumára’s exposition of the *Bhúman*.

Now, from what has been already said, it is evident that ethical attributes like love and holiness are as much parts of the divine nature as the metaphysical ones of knowledge and infinitude. The Upanishads do not reason out these divine attributes in the way the philosophical theology

of the West does. They show a more direct way of reaching and realising them, a way which I have already indicated. When we, through meditation, realise the presence of the Infinite in us and in the world—realise him as our very Self and the Self of what we call the world, we feel, we see with the directness of vision, a vision inseparable from our self-consciousness, that he is love, bliss and holiness. In this high act of communion the worshipper and the worshipped are seen to be essentially one, a unity-in-difference, and the love, bliss and holiness felt by the former are seen as belonging to and flowing from the latter. The source of love, bliss and holiness must necessarily be loving, blissful and holy. However, we may as well hear the metrical Upanishads a little on these eminently personal attributes of God,—I say eminently, because knowledge and infinitude also, as we have seen in our first and second lectures, imply difference as well as unity, and are therefore personal attributes. Now, the *Isopanishad* speaks of Brahman as “शुद्धमपापविद्धम्”, holy, untouched by sin, and as one who “याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः”—“disposed of things rightly for eternal years.” The *Kenopanishad*, in its anecdote of Brahmanavidyá, shows the divine solicitude for the spiritual welfare of his creatures. When the *devas*, it is said, had

become proud of their conquest over the *asuras* and ignorantly thought that it was by their own powers that they had vanquished their enemies, Brahman appeared to them in an adorable form, a form, however, which they could not recognise, and when Agni and Váyu, the presiding deities of fire and air, approached him and spoke of themselves as able respectively to burn and carry away everything, he drew back the power with which he had endowed them, and thus rendered them powerless, so that they could not burn or carry away even such a light thing as a straw. Indra, the god of thunder, at last learnt from “बहुशोभमाना उमा हैमवती”, “the most beautiful Umá, or Protectress, living in the Himalayas,” a metaphorical representation of Brahman or Theology, which arose from the meditations of sages living in the Himalayan regions, that the power the *devas* boasted of, all power in fact, rests in and flows from Brahman. Again, the *Kathopanishad* speaks of Brahman as “य एष सुप्तेषु जागर्त्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिमाणः” —“The Person who wakes while his creatures sleep, and who shapes one thing after another to meet their desires.” It also speaks of him as “महद्भयं वज्रमुद्यतं”, “very terrible, like a thunderbolt about to fall,” and adds :

भयादस्याग्निस्तपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः ।

भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः ॥

—“ From fear of him does fire burn, from fear of him does the sun shine, from fear of him do Indra and Váyu and fifthly Death do their respective work.” These elements are supposed to be presided over by distinct deities who do their respective duties under the moral government of the supreme Lord.

Now, as I said in my second lecture, it is the *Svetásvatara Upanishad* in which the personality of God finds the most clear and prominent recognition. Fully recognising his immanence in and unity with man and the world, it at the same time never loses sight of his transcendence, his distinction from them, and at every turn speaks of him as man's object of worship, as his Creator, Preserver, Inspirer, Guide and ultimate Goal. The author has a clear idea of God as the Supreme Good, *Sivam*, though this idea does not, at his hands, flower into such intimate relationships between God and man as that of a parent to a child, a friend to a friend, or a husband to a wife. The relationship he conceives between the individual and the universal self are indeed ethical as well as metaphysical, but in the author's mind there is no distinction between these two sets of relationships, and so in his utterances, many of them characterised by great beauty and grandeur,

the moral and metaphysical perfections of God are mixed up. However, whether he speaks of the one class or the other of the attributes of God, he always keeps up a reverent attitude towards him—one which absolute Monists, ignoring the distinction between God and man, are apt to lose at every turn,—and prays to him for शुभवृत्ति, good sense, the sense or understanding that leads us to liberation. One idea, found in other Upanishads also, is very prominent here, the idea of a cosmic soul, called Brahmá or Hira-nyagarbha, who is conveyed to be the first of all created beings, and whom, it is supposed, the Supreme Lord endowed with wisdom and power at the beginning of creation. The under-current of our author's constant prayer is that the Lord may inspire and guide us in the same manner as he did his first-born child. In his third chapter, the author says :

यो देवानां प्रभवस्योद्भवश्च

विश्वाधिपो रुद्रो महर्षिः ।

हिरण्यगर्भं जनयामास पूर्वं

स नो बुद्ध्या शुभया संयुनक्तु ॥

“ He who is the cause of the birth and power of the *devas*,—Rudra, the Lord of all, the omniscient, who at the beginning begot Hira-nyagarbha,—may he grant us good understand-

ing.” Then, in the words of the *Yajurveda Samhitá*, he prays,

या ते रुद्र शिवा तनूरघोरापापकाशिनी ।
तया नस्तनुवा शन्तमया गिरिशन्ताभिचाकशोहि ॥

“O Rudra, who livest in our mountain and spreadest happiness, look upon us with that benign form of thine which is auspicious, shorn of terror, and imparts holiness.”

In the same chapter, a little later on, it is said :

सर्वाननशिरोग्रीवः सर्वभूतगुहाशयः ।
सर्वव्यापी स भगवान् तस्मात् सर्वगतः शिवः ॥
महान् प्रभुर्वै पुरुषः सत्त्वस्यैष प्रवर्त्तकः ।
सुनिर्गलामिमां प्राप्तिमीशानो ज्योतिरव्ययः ॥

“ His are all faces, heads and necks, and he is seated in the hearts of all. The Lord is all-pervading and so he, the good, impenetrates all things. Verily the (supreme) Person is the great Master, and is the soul’s guide. He leads us to the state of perfect holiness ; he is light and he is unchangeable.” Again :

सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम् ।
सर्वस्य प्रभुमीशानं सर्वस्य शरणं ब्रूहत् ॥

“ They (the wise) know him to be the source of the power of all the senses, but himself devoid

of all senses ; the Lord and Guide of all, the great Refuge of all.”

In the next chapter the author quotes the well-known and oft-quoted verse from the *Rig-veda* which conceives God as a great bird sitting in the same tree, that is the body, with the human soul and looking on while the latter eats sweet fruits :

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया
समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त-
नम्रन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥

“Two birds, related to each other, and friends, are sheltered in the same tree. One of them eats sweet fruits, while the other looks on without eating.” At the end of the chapter, the author again prays for protection :

अजात इत्येवं कश्चिद्भीरुः प्रतिपद्यते ।
रुद्र यत्ते दक्षिणं मुखं तेन मां पाहि नित्यम् ॥

—“ ‘Thou art unborn,’ with these words one who is in terror takes refuge in thee. O Rudra, protect me ever with that auspicious form of thine.” The second line of this verse, is, as some of you must know, a part of the formula of public worship in the Bráhma Samáj. I shall make only one more extract, and that from the last chapter :

स वृक्षकालाकृतिभिः परोऽन्यो
यस्मात् प्रपञ्चः परिवर्त्ततेऽयम् ।
धर्मावहं पापनुदं भगीशं
ज्ञात्वात्मस्थममृतं विश्वधाम ॥
एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः
सर्वव्यापो सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।
कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः
साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च ॥

“ He is above the forms of the world and of time, and is different from them,—he through whom the world is moving. He who knows the Inspirer of virtue and the Destroyer of sin, the Lord of glory, the Undying, the Support of all, as seated in his own heart, (obtains liberation). The one God is hidden in all things; he is omnipresent and the Inner Self of all. He superintends all work and lives in all beings. He is the Witness, the Inspirer, detached and above all *gunas*.”

I shall now go back once more to the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, remind you of the passage I have already quoted from its first chapter, that which speaks of the Self as being dearer to everyone of us than anything else, and then refer to the ‘ Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa ’ of the same Upanishad, the section which I dealt with at some length in my first lecture. The main teaching of

this section contains, in a nutshell as it were, the Upanishadic philosophy of love, a philosophy which, it seems to me, has not had its proper development, either in theory or in practice, at the hands of those who profess to follow the religion of the Upanishads. The two passages referred to seem to be the utterance of the same thinker,—though the Upanishad does not say so—the second being only an amplification of the first. In my first lecture I brought out only the metaphysical implication of the second passage, the necessary correlation of subject and object. I would now show its ethical implication. Yājñavalkya says that other things are dear to us not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the Self. The husband loves the wife, not as anything foreign to him, unrelated to him, but as something related to him, something that affects him, something that he feels or conceives as good for him. The wife loves the husband in the same manner. Likewise parents love their children in the same way. The same is true of our love for our race, our possessions, and all other things related to us. The secret, the source, of love is relation to Self, essential unity with Self. But what is this Self which we all instinctively love, and what is its relation to the things which seem distinct from it? Yājñavalkya is unequivocal in his answer to this question. He says, “इदं ब्रह्म, इदं क्षत्रम्, इमे लोकाः, इमे

देवाः, इमानि भूतानि, इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा ।”—“ This Bráhmaṇa caste, this Kshatriya caste, these worlds, these gods, these elements, all this is the Self.” In other words the distinction which we feel between the Self and things which we call other than it is not a separation, not a division, but is based on an underlying unity. This unity, which makes the whole world one,—one in God—“अभेदः परमात्मनि”—is revealed only to the wise. Ordinary people vaguely feel it only in particular instances. In the case of father, mother, husband, wife, children, their own caste or race, their possessions or things affecting them pleasantly, they feel that the things related to them are their own, one with their selves in some sense or degree. Other things, things which do not attract them, or which actually repel them, are supposed by them as quite other than they. But the wise man, who, in the words of the *Isopanishad*, ‘सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यति, सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं’, “sees all things in the Self and the Self in all things,” not only does not hate anybody, ‘ततो न विजुगुप्सते’, but to him “आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति—” “for the sake of the Self the universe itself becomes dear.” But if such is the case with the साधक, the aspirant after the life divine, what must be true

of the “सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा” “एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति.” “the Self of all creatures, who makes his one form many,” to whom no one is an alien, from whom no one is apart? As related to him, as essentially one with him, as part of himself, everyone must be dear to him, as dear as his own self. Every individual self, then, as one with the Universal, and as potentially possessing his perfection, must be infinitely dear to him. The life of the individual must therefore be a continuous flow of the divine love, leading it at every step towards that perfection which is assured to every soul by its unity with the Over-soul,—unity both in essence and in love. It must be seen clearly that the love of God for man is not a mere inference, though the form in which I am stating it may make it appear to be so. The fact is that it is as directly known as our own love, our love for ourselves and for others, with which it is really identical. As we directly see the Infinite Self as our own self, so we directly feel the divine love as our own love. As we see the divine Self in everything seen by us, so we feel the love of God in everything or person we love. I have worked out at some length this point—this doctrine of human love as a direct manifestation of the divine love—in my *Brahmasādhana* and my *Krishna and the Gītā*. But you see that the doctrine, though not the detailed exposition of it, has its source in the Upanishads. The Upani-

shads nowhere say in so many words that God loves man with an infinite love. This leads superficial readers of it to think and say that they are only *Jnānasāstras* and not *Bhaktisāstras*. And a certain class of their expounders, who, though they cannot be set down as superficial students of them, must nevertheless be reckoned as one-sided, even accepts this verdict. But you will see, if you follow up the hints I have given, that they contain a doctrine of love profounder than any that is to be found in other sacred writings, Indian or foreign,—profounder because it is based on a truer insight into human nature and its relation to the divine than we find elsewhere. This is specially true of the teachings of the *Isopaniśhad*, the “*Brahmánanda-valli*” of the *Taittirīya Upaniśhad*, the “*Nārada-Sanat Kumāra-Sambāda*” of the *Chhāndogya* and the “*Maitreyī Bráhmāna*,” just referred to, of the *Brihad-áranyaka*.

Now, the reason why this Upanishadic doctrine of love has not had its proper development, must be sought after, and if this is due to any defect must be closely examined and, if possible, remedied. This is a most important subject and has a great bearing on the religious future of the country. The religion of the Upanishads is being revived and preached anew. The Bráhma Sámaj has, from the days of its great

founder, taken and is still taking a most important part in this revival. That is all right: But what we should not forget is that this revival of our ancient religion should not be a revival of its errors and defects. And not only must its errors and defects be avoided, but what is undeveloped in it must also be developed. Now, in my first lecture I have shown how some of the *rishis* of the Upanishads misunderstood the nature of the divine unity—or how, at any rate, they were misunderstood and misinterpreted by some of their exponents,—how this unity was understood as opposed and not complementary to difference, and how the difference constituting the world, both of nature and man, were set down as illusory. We know how deeply this error has affected and is still affecting the social and spiritual life of the nation,—how thousands whose love for truth and the higher life marked them out as extraordinary men, and would have made them most valued members of society if they had devoted themselves to its service, were led by such mistaken philosophy to forsake a world which they seriously held as a false appearance, quite unworthy of their devotion, and betook themselves to the life-long contemplation of an abstract unity. A similar misunderstanding and misinterpretation exists in relation to the Upanishadic philosophy of love and has led, on

the one hand, to the neglect of the higher emotions and on the other to irrational and even immoral ways of cultivating them. The love of Self, which is the central doctrine of the practical philosophy of the Upanishads, has often been understood as the love of an abstract unity, a unity unrelated to the differences which constitute domestic and social life. Such a unity, though theoretically held to be infinite, is really a finite thing, as it excludes instead of including everything, and thus love for it fails to produce the graces and excellences that are expected from a healthy spiritual life. Its contemplation is indeed held to be joyful—intensely joyful; but this joy, when really enjoyed by the devotee, seems due to a more or less unconscious attribution of concrete and personal attributes to the object of contemplation. In fact contemplation itself implies a difference between the subject and the object of contemplation, and the Unqualified Monist's statement that he finds his undifferentiated unity to be supremely blissful, involves a contradiction. The bliss he feels is the blissfulness of a unity-in-difference. I have shown all this at some length in my *Krishna and the Gítá*, specially in my lecture on the *Gítá* ideal of *bhakti*. On the other hand, the recognition of the truth that there can be no love,—no *prem*,—no *bhakti* properly so called—without difference, coupled with the misinterpretation of the

philosophy of the Upanishads as purely monistic, has led to the promulgation of purely artificial methods of cultivating love—methods based either on the blind acceptance of Puranic myths as historical truths or on the politic presentation of them as truths though knowing all the while that they are not truths. The harm done by these methods is even greater in magnitude than the one already referred to, for while philosophical Monism is intelligible only to the learned and thoughtful few, *avatáris*m, idolatry, indecent songs and poems, and immoral practices prescribed and adopted in the name of religion, appeal to the many irrespective of learning and culture. The importance of a proper understanding, interpretation, and, if necessary, reform and remodelling, of the Upanishadic doctrine of love cannot therefore be exaggerated. What then is the true import of that doctrine? The Self, the Upanishads teach, is most dear to itself and things conceived to be other than the Self are dear only for its sake. But really there is nothing other than the Self. The Self is infinite and all-comprehensive. All things are the Self or Brahman—“*Sarvam khalu idam Brahma*” (*Chhándogya* III, 14.) Brahman is the Inner Self of all creatures—“*Eko vasi sarva-bhútántarátmá*” (*Katha*, V. 12). His self-love then is the love of all creatures, and as the *Brahma-sádhaka*, the aspirant after the life divine, grows in wisdom

and love, his self-love must grow more and more into the love of all creatures. Now, as, I have already said, the logic of abstract unity, of unity as opposed and not complementary to difference, stood in the way of many thinkers duly understanding the Upanishadic philosophy of love and reducing it to practice in a comprehensive form. Love of Self was understood by them as the love of an abstract unity—the individuality of a single person in his isolation from other persons and things, and not the love of the whole world—of all persons, and of things as useful to persons. Instead of growing into such a broad and all-comprehensive love, the love of Self was understood as demanding the abandonment of domestic and social life, with the duties pertaining to them. This mistake appeared in its most exaggerated form in medieval times, but even in the days of the Upanishads, when *rishis* like Janaka, Praváhana, Jaivali and Uddálaka Aruni combined the highest wisdom with a broad domestic and social life, even with kingship, we find thinkers, misled by the logic of abstract unity, disparaging the desire for domestic and social life and extolling the life of the mendicant. Even such an ancient Upanishad as the *Brihadáranyaka*, not to speak of such comparatively later *Atharvana* Upanishads as the *Prasna* and the *Mándúkya*, says : “एतद्ध स वै तत्पूर्व्वं विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽय-

—“ Knowing this, the people of old did not wish for offspring. ‘ What shall we do with offspring,’ they said, ‘ we who have this Self and this world ’ (i.e., the world of Brahman)? And they, having risen above the desire for sons, wealth and worlds, took to the life of mendicants.” (IV, 4.) But is not such teaching incompatible with the following hymn to the all-comprehensive Self in the *Svetâsvatara* Upanishad and with numerous other utterances in the Upanishads in the same strain?—

त्वं स्त्री त्वं पुमानसि त्वं
 कुमार उत वा कुमारी ।
 त्वं जीर्णो दण्डेन वञ्चसि
 त्वं जातो भवसि विश्वतोमुखः ॥
 नीलः पतङ्गो हरितो लोहिताक्ष-
 स्तडिङ्गर्भ ऋतवः समुद्राः ।
 अनादिमत्त्वं विभुत्वेन वर्त्तसे
 यतो जातानि भुवनानि विश्वाः ॥

—“Thou art woman and thou art man; thou art boy and thou art girl; thou, as an old man, walkest with the help of a staff. Thou art born with thy face on all sides. Thou art the blue fly and the green bird with red eyes. Thou art the

cloud, the seasons and the seas. Thou art infinite and pervadest all,—thou, from whom all worlds have arisen.” (IV. 3 and 4.)

The fact is that long before the dawn of true wisdom, the individual man vaguely feels his unity with his kith and kin, becomes attached to them and lives a crude domestic life, though it may be little better than the life of a pair of brutes with their offspring. Soon this domestic life expands into the corporate life of a tribe, and the love of self and the good for the self becomes identified with the love of the tribe and the promotion of its interests. Gradually, with the deepening and expansion of thought and the multiplication of interests the tribal life grows into the national, and this again into the international or broadly human. One's own real good is gradually found to be not opposed to, but really identical with, that of one's fellow-beings. When wisdom comes, it shows that this growth in men's social and moral life is due to the fundamental unity of self in them—due to the fact that the Divine Father, to speak in Christian phraseology, makes his human children out of his own substance and in his own image. When wisdom comes and shows this, man's more or less unconscious growth from individualistic to domestic life, from the domestic to the tribal and from the tribal to the national and the international, becomes conscious, and the international or

human life itself is deepened into the spiritual or divine. The love of man is identified with the love of God, and social and religious duty become one. It is not true wisdom, therefore, but its caricature,—it is something which is mistaken for wisdom but is really not wisdom—that teaches isolation, aloofness from human society, and a life of mendicancy; and it is because this mistaken view of the higher life was supposed to be taught by the Upanishads that their real teaching on love failed to promote a healthy development of moral and spiritual life in many of their followers.

And then again, as the real denotation of the Self, its quantitative import, its all-comprehensiveness, was missed, so was its real connotation, its quality, its infinite richness of attributes, misunderstood; and as on the one hand the love of Self was confined to the love of an abstract unity, so was it confined to a single one of its attributes—*jñānam* or *chaitanyam*, which again was conceived in the most abstract form, denuded of all relations that might give it meaning and concreteness. The fact is that as with the advance of civilisation there goes on an expansion of selfhood in quantity, and man finds his real good not in isolation from his kind, but in a gradually broader and broader identification with humanity, so there proceeds also a growing depth of self-knowledge,—a deeper and deeper insight

into the inner nature of the self,—the qualities and attributes which really constitute it,—and a correspondingly clear and clearer revelation of what its real good consists in. In his most primitive state man sees his real good only in the satisfaction of his animal appetites—in feeding, clothing, and housing himself and in propagating his kind. His higher nature lies dormant and all but unconscious in him. From this purely or dominantly sensuous life there emerge slowly the domestic and social affections—parental and filial love, kindness for neighbours and reverence for elders, friendship and the romantic love of sex for sex; and response to the demands of this emotional nature, irrespective of any satisfaction of animal appetites, seems itself to be a good. And then come the love of knowledge for knowledge's sake, the pursuit of the sciences for their own intrinsic worth, and the love of the sublime and the beautiful for their own inherent excellence. And lastly comes reverence for the Infinite, hallowing all concerns of life and claiming the whole-hearted homage of our souls. Thus the love of self is seen to be the love of our total nature—sensuous, emotional, intellectual, æsthetic and spiritual, and the good for self is identified with the harmonious development of all these aspects of human life. How little is all this understood by those who describe

the self as an undifferentenced consciousness devoid of all qualities and without connection with the beauty and grandeur of nature and the complex but sweet relations of social life ! No wonder that the real import of the Upanishadic philosophy of love has been missed by them and that their scheme of life and spiritual culture is understood as leading to the emasculation and starvation of human nature. No wonder that the reform movement inaugurated by the composers of the Upanishads failed to drive away the lower forms of the national religion, failed to raise our domestic and social life to a higher and more refined stage, and though lifting up a chosen few to a purer and moré intellectual life, made them indifferent to the concrete concerns of life and consigned them to a narrow life of ascetic contemplation. No wonder that such results, found associated with the profession and promulgation of the religion of the Upanishads, emboldened some to devise schemes of theology and religious culture which tended to put out the very light issuing out of the inspired *rishis* of the Upanishads,—emboldened them to bring back the fancied deities who were flying away from this light and to give them forms and places in the national pantheon which they have retained for centuries ! If therefore we rejoice that that light is again shining in the land, we should see that we receive the light in its true form and

fulness, as lighting up both the whole depth and breadth of our complex life and nature. If, as the Upanishads say, God is our very Self and the Self of the world, we should not be contented till the vision of him within and without as the *Ekam eva advitiyam* has become the very breath of our life. If, as the same sacred writings say, the Self is most dear to every one, we should love the Self not only in our own persons, but in the person of everyone of our fellow-beings, both in those who are near us and those who are far. And if the Supreme Self, as the *rishis* say, in spite of its unity, manifests itself in the infinite variety of natural forms and human relations, no aspect of our infinitely varied life should be overlooked by us, but the practical love of self should include the earnest and devout culture of our total nature, from the lowest or animal to the highest or spiritual. This, and not anything less than this, seems to be the message of the Upanishads to this age of science and culture.

On the other hand, our real good being this comprehensive thing,—the harmonious development of our total nature,—and our own love,—our love of ourselves and of those related to us—being a direct manifestation and witness of God's infinite love, we must think of him as incessantly active in the promotion of this good,—active not only in the general laws which govern

nature and mind, but in the inner and outer life of every one of us. His love being not merely an object of inferential knowledge, but a datum of direct knowledge to each one of us, his relation to each person must be thought of as most direct and personal. Indeed who can be so near to us as the Infinite in whom we live, move and have our being? No one of us is or can be alone, but in the life of every one there are the Infinite and the finite in unity and difference, 'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं बृहत् परिषस्वजाते, the former only giving and looking on, the latter enjoying his love. As every movement of our conscious and volitional life is guided by our self-love, the direct manifestation of God's love, so every unconscious and involuntary movement of our life, every action in nature, must be thought of as directed by his love. From what we have said so far, there is no escape from this conclusion. And for the same reason the love of our relatives and friends must also be thought of as manifestations of the divine love. The unloving action of our opponents must be ascribed to the limitations of their knowledge, their inability to see their real relations to us,—an inability which we must believe as gradually passing away under the loving guidance of God. Now, when such a view is taken of God's relations to us, it becomes comparatively easy to realise the loving presence of God. He

is seen to be guiding the very twinklings of our eye-lids, our in-going and out-going breath, the circulation of our blood, the digestion of our food, the actions of our eyes, ears and other senses, the appearance of ideas and thoughts in our minds and their disappearance from them. It is he who feeds us, clothes us, lays us to rest and reawakes us from our slumbers. It is he who guides every step we take in our physical and spiritual lives and over-rules our mistakes and shortcomings. It is he who helps me to read this paper to you and enables you to hear and understand it. It is he who loves us and takes care of us in our father and mother, in our brothers and sisters, in husband and wife, in son and daughter. There is only one love, and that is his: human loves are only particles of that infinite love. I need not dwell upon the subject. It is in the power of every one to think upon this endless theme and try to understand and realise it as best as he can. You will see that there is no room for fancy in the matter. Everything I have said and could say on it is fact, stern fact. You may, if you like, give a free play to your imagination, but it can outstrip neither the realities nor the possibilities of infinite love—they are more, they are better, than your poor thoughts can picture them. I shall therefore close with only one more word and that is this: If the love of the Infinite One for the finite is

so true, so real, so very near to us, how unnecessary, nay how unwise, how harmful, is it to imagine, in order to form an idea of his love, special incarnations of him and think of him as having destroyed this or that demon, worked this or that miracle, loved this or that man as his friend or this or that woman as his wife or mistress! It seems to me that it is only when man loses sight of the nearness of God and the reality and depth of his love for every individual, that he invents these false methods of spiritual culture. When the truth of the Upanishadic teaching on the nearness, lovingness, and sweetness of God is seen, these lame man's crutches are seen to be worse than useless. It is then seen that notwithstanding our deep debt to teachers, prophets, and scriptures, old and new, no teacher or prophet is so near as God, and no revelation so bright as that of God's love in the heart. It is then seen that no father, no mother, no husband, no wife, can touch the heart so closely, so deeply, as the Soul of our souls and that these human relationships are quite inadequate to express the transcendent relationship of God and man. May we be true to this revelation and instead of wandering in devious paths hold fast the divine hand of guidance stretched out to us and thus be led to eternal union with him who is our Goal and our supreme

and endless Bliss ! “एषास्य परमा गति रेषास्य परमा
सम्पद् एषोऽस्य परमो लोक एषोऽस्य परम
आनन्द एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रासुपजीवन्ति ।”

“ He is our supreme goal, our supreme wealth,
our supreme abode, our supreme bliss. Other
beings enjoy only a particle of this bliss.” (The
Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, IV. 3. 32.)

LECTURE IV

MODERN THEISM IN THE LIGHT OF UPANISHADIC THEISM

By our first three lectures we have got some idea of the Theism of the Upanishads. In our first two we contemplated its metaphysical and in our third its ethical and emotional aspects. We have seen that it is the doctrine of an Infinite Self containing all space and time and yet transcending their limitations, that though one and undivided, this Universal Self manifests itself as the life of innumerable individual selves, establishes ethical relations with them, and leads them to conscious union with it. We have seen too that this doctrine is not a system of unqualified Monism, but one of unity-in-difference. Now, it is evident that such a system of Theism is not intelligible to unreflective people, who, even when they reject Polytheism and rise to Monotheism, adhere to some lower form of Theism. This was so even in the days of the Upanishads, as we find from several passages in them, and it has been so since, both in this country and abroad. We need not speak particularly of ancient times. Our concern mostly is with our own days, and we shall now deal with the forms of Theism which now prevail in this country and in those

with which it is in more or less direct intercourse. I shall speak particularly of the forms of Theism which the Christian religion and Christian philosophy have introduced into this country and also those indigenous forms which have been more or less influenced by western thought. I shall leave untouched those which are based merely on a blind appeal to authority and show no intellectual life. My belief is that though manifesting an ephemeral activity for a few years or decades, they will be swept away by the advancing tide of free thought: The imperfectly rational may grow into the perfectly rational, but the blind or irrational has no permanent place in this age of Reason, or it has a place only in the minds of those who shun the light of Reason and prefer to live under the shade and shelter of Authority.

- Now, the Rational Theology of the west recognises four proofs of the existence of God, (1) the Causal or Cosmological, (2) the Teleological, (3) the Ontological, and (4) the Moral, which last some theologians regard as only a form of the Ontological. These four proofs correspond to four stages of human thought, (1) the physical, (2) the biological, (3) the mental, and (4) the moral, and are based on the presuppositions or basal principles of the Physical, Biological, Mental and Moral Sciences. It will be seen, when I have given brief expositions of these proofs, that

they really represent different forms of Theism which may be identified with actual historical or contemporary forms prevalent in this and other countries, forms whose value may be estimated by the scope and merits of the proofs which underlie them. Thus it will be seen that the Vedic Monotheism of Svámí Dayánanda Sarasvatí, so far as it is a reasoned system, belongs to the second or teleological stage of theistic thought and does not rise higher, and that Vedantism, as interpreted by Svámí Vivekánanda, ignores the fourth or highest stage of thought and though rising to the third or Ontological stage, does not fully see its implications. However, I proceed to a brief exposition of these proofs with the hope that those who should not be satisfied by my brief statement would seek for longer and perhaps more satisfactory statements in my published works or other works on Rational Theism. My belief is that a mastery of these proofs is essential to a proper understanding of matters theological, specially to a due estimate of the value of the different forms of ancient and modern Theism from the highest, which I identify with that of the Upanishads, to the Deism which forms the religion of ordinary educated people of the present time in this and other civilised countries. Without a proper grasp of the scope and value of these proofs one may hear and talk a good deal of various systems of reli-

gion, but cannot have any but the vaguest notion of their real worth as theories or ideals of life. I may add, before I proceed to these statements, that recently some forms of Theism more or less affected by the Pluralism or Humanism of some western thinkers have come into prominence. These are not based on the current proofs of the existence of God, but are defended by arguments peculiar to the systems of philosophy to which they belong. These new forms of Theism will be taken up when I have dealt with the more current and better known forms.

The first proof,* the Causal or Cosmological, has many forms. I choose the one which is most current in modern English thought. It has been recently made popular by the philosophical writings of James Martineau and his followers. It is based on the conception of force as an efficient cause, a conception common to popular and scientific thought. In physical science everything is reduced to force. Even atoms are explained as centres of force. But the conception of force is metaphysical; it is not a datum of sensuous knowledge. Hence it is rejected by some scientists and by David Hume, the father of Sensationalism, and Auguste Comte, the founder of Positivism. Its source is our volitional

* See the author's *Philosophy of Bráhmaism*, Lecture V, *Religion of Brahman*, Chapter II and *Roots of Faith*. Also his *Brahmajijnásá*. (in English), Appendix A.

experience, and in that experience the production of change is inseparably connected with knowledge and intention. Force or power, apart from knowledge and intention, is an abstraction. Those who do not see this, think that in force or power as something unknown, unknowable, inconceivable, they have got the ultimate cause or reality of the universe. The Agnostic's God is only those abstract names, Power, Cause, Reality, etc., spelt with initial capital letters. There are thus only two alternatives open to human thought—(1) the total rejection of the notion of force or power and the consequent representation of the world as a series of changes without any necessary link connecting them, as consistent sceptics like Hume and Comte have done, and (2) the recognition of the Supreme Power as nothing less than a Supreme Mind. There is no room for the Agnostic deification of an abstraction like force. But if there is, and can be, nothing like unconscious cause or force, do we not go back to the days of the *Rigveda* and imagine the world as governed by numerous divine beings like Indra, Váyu, Varuna and Agni? No, the scientific doctrine of the correlation and convertibility of forces, the doctrine that all forces are ultimately one and that all material bodies, however distant from one another, are connected by gravitation, saves us from this primitive polytheism. The unity of the universe,

the mutual connection of its parts, points to the unity of its Creator and Preserver. But the scientific doctrine of the unity of forces is only a more or less probable generalisation and cannot lift us to a firm belief in the unity of God. However, here is the first or most elementary form of speculative Theism, a form which is found in all ethnic religions, Hindu, Christian or Muhammadan. Many current forms included in these religions do not rise even to this height. They have no clear idea that all force must be conscious and thus they conceive of material and unconscious forces which they cannot reconcile with the power of God. They postulate uncreated eternal atoms as the material cause (*upādan kāran*) with which God manufactured the world as a watchmaker does a watch. They do not see that atoms must have the power of resistance, and that therefore the God they worship is a warring God, continually striving to bring matter under his control. Then, as to individual souls, they being themselves sources of activity from which the very idea of force is derived, they cannot, merely by the proof stated, be demonstrated as created by or emanating from the Power that works in nature. Religions belonging to this stage of thought, therefore, and those of lower stages, naturally conceive of individual souls as independent of and co-eternal with God. How God, thus conceived as exter-

nal to our souls, guides us and answers our prayers, these systems of Theism, if they at all deserve the name, cannot of course explain by any means.

However, let us come to our second proof* and the forms of Theism represented by it. The Teleological Proof is a form of the Causal Proof rather than a distinct one. It confirms, with quite an infinite richness of illustration, the truth proved by the first argument that all changes must have a conscious will behind them as their cause. It assumes the form of a distinct proof only if the universality of this proposition is denied and only a certain class of changes ascribed to design or intention. In that case, however, the force of this proof is much lessened. If there could be any non-mental cause of phenomena, even of what are called material phenomena, vast domains of creation would be left unexplained by this proof. However, even if the existence of mere mechanical laws and forces is admitted, it can be shown, and the Teleological Proof proposes to show this, that organism is inexplicable by them. There is a superficial form of the proof, made familiar by Paley, which has recently been much assailed by scientific thinkers. On the analogy of the mechanism of a watch one may attempt to show that there are

* See *The Philosophy of Bráhmaism*, Lecture V, *Religion of Brahman*, Chap. III and *Brahmajijnásá*, App. A.

things in nature wonderfully adapted to certain ends, and that therefore these adaptations are designed or intended by a divine mechanic. To such an argument it may be objected that neither the parts of an animal organism nor those of the world were put together like those of a watch, but are evidently the result of a process of growth or evolution guided by fixed laws, and may be, for aught we know, the outcome of mechanical forces. A deeper and really the true form of the Teleological Proof is to show that the characteristics of organism are very different from those of inorganic matter and that those characteristics are inexplicable without reference to mind. They are (1) self-sustenance, (2) growth from relative homogeneity to heterogeneity, (3) co-ordination of whole and parts, and (4) reproduction. A vegetable seed or animal germ sustains itself by acting from within and not from without like mechanical force. Its action is assimilation, and not accretion. It selects the materials needed for its growth and rejects those not so needed. It grows into a complexity quite inexplicable by its original simplicity. The parts or limbs of an organism like a tree or an animal body serves the whole, and the whole serves the parts. Every complete organism produces seeds or germs for its reproduction and thus perpetuates its kind to an indefinite extent. Thus every organism has a *poten-*

tiality quite inexplicable by mechanical or chemical laws. Even the most powerful microscope could not discover a tree in a seed or an animal in a germ. The action of a seed or germ is indeed the opposite of the action of material atoms. While in mechanical or chemical products the cause determines the effect, and the parts the whole, for instance the particles of a stone determine its composition, and hydrogen and oxygen determine water, in organisms it is the effect that determines the cause and the whole that determines the parts. It is the completed tree or animal body that determines the action of the seed or the germ. In the same manner it is the future—what is to come—that determines the present or past, and not the reverse, as in inorganic matter. Now, all this is explicable only if the effect, the whole, the future, exists as *idea* or *thought* in the cause, the parts, and the present or past,—in other words if the whole process is designed by an all-determining Person. There is no room for chance or accident in the case. The very essence of chance is irregularity. The constant succession of an innumerable variety of organisms can never be accidental. It cannot be so any more than human action, which also is partly subject to mechanical laws. The Design Argument, it should be seen, is not drawn from the analogy of human actions to the actions of nature. That our fellow-beings have designing

souls like ourselves is as little directly known to us as the existence of a soul in nature. It is only our own souls that are directly known to us, and from this datum of direct knowledge we infer inductively, so long as we are in this stage of thought, the existence both of individual souls more or less like our selves and a Cosmic Soul as the cause of actions similar to ours. The evidence in the latter case is not a whit less powerful than in the former; it is rather overwhelmingly more powerful. However, coming to inorganic matter, we see that though things like air and water seem explicable by mere chemical or mechanical laws, the insufficiency of such explanations become patent the moment the relation of these things to life is considered. The adaptability of air and water to the growth and preservation of organisms is inexplicable without reference to purpose. In the same manner, the whole world may be shown to be a vast organism animated and sustained by a Supreme Mind.

Now, it will be clear to all who have followed me so far that though the proof just stated confirms and elucidates the first proof, it does not solve the problems raised but left unsolved by that proof, namely those of the creation of matter and the human mind. And the reason for this has already been stated. The Teleological as much as the Cosmological, is a causal proof, one based on the idea of cause, and a cause can ex-

plain only effects or events ; it cannot explain a substance. Now, matter and mind are not effects or changes, but substances or related aspects of a single substance. It can never be proved that there was a time when they were not, and it may even be shown that they cannot be thought of as non-existent. But true Theism, the doctrine of an infinite all-comprehending Being, must show that they do not stand out as realities independent of God, but are essentially related to and dependent on him. No argument which is merely causal in its nature, which draws a sharp line of distinction and separation between cause and effect, matter and mind, subject and object, finite and infinite, and so on, and which does not seek the unity underlying the apparent diversity of the world, can possibly show this and thereby rationalise our belief in the existence of the Infinite and Absolute. Any argument competent to show this must be more or less metaphysical, and dive beneath the dualism of popular thought. Such an argument is the Ontological Proof* in the form it has assumed at the hands of the modern philosophical theologians of the west. In its first form the argument was put forth by Archbishop Anselm of Canterbury, who lived in the latter part of the eleventh century. It sought to bridge the chasm of

* See *The Philosophy of Bráhmaism*, Lec. IV, and *Brahmajijnásá*, Chaps. I—III.

idea and reality, thinking[•] and being, by the simple assertion that the idea of a Perfect Being which all of us have in a more or less distinct form implies *existence* as one of the attributes of such a Being—that a Perfect Being without existence is not really a Perfect Being. Kant criticised this proof by saying that the thought of a Perfect Being, even with the attribute of *existence* added to it, no more proved the reality of such a Being than the mere thought of a hundred thalers lying in one's pocket proved their actual existence there. Now, this criticism proceeds upon an identification of thought with imagination. Thought as imagination is not indeed identical with existence, but thought as knowledge is so. The analysis of knowledge reveals a synthesis of knowing and being. That it does not seem to do so to the common and even the scientific understanding, is due to the fact that both ordinary and scientific thought is governed by the logic of non-contradiction applied in a superficial way, according to which unity and difference are opposed, whereas a higher logic, or the same logic applied with a deeper insight, sees a unity in relation to and not opposed to difference, and a difference unopposed to unity. Philosophical analysis, guided by this higher logic, reveals in every reality a subjective aspect, an aspect of knowing, on the one hand, and an objective aspect, an aspect of being, on the other.

This book, for instance, which is something seen, touched and felt, is essentially related to a seeing, touching and feeling self, a self which is as much in the book as in the body, as much objective as subjective, and without relation to which the book has no meaning whatever. The moments or aspects of knowing and being revealed in each reality are a unity-in-difference and constitute concrete reality,—a mere subject and a mere object being abstractions. Matter or the extended necessarily implies mind or the unextended as its correlate. The unity of space implies as its correlate the unity of consciousness, and consciousness as finite, as manifested in particular portions of space, implies an Infinite Consciousness transcending the limitations of space. If we examine time, we see that in consciousness conceived as finite or individual—in our waking or sleeping life,—not only sensation, but thought also, even the thought of self, is changing and intermittent. But the constant appearance, disappearance and re-appearance of consciousness in knowledge, oblivion, memory, sleep and re-waking can be explained only by the existence of an Absolute Consciousness in which all facts are eternally present. The common belief in an external world of facts—facts which exist whether we, as individuals, know them or not—is indeed true; but it is a belief which does not quite know what it is. The externality ascribed to the world

is not an externality to thought or knowledge as such, but to thought or knowledge appearing in a finite, individual and changing form. As not depending upon finite thought, the world may be called an external world, but its externality does not mean externality or unrelatedness to all thought whatever, to thought as thought. What we call finite thought is not essentially finite, but has an infinite aspect, an aspect in which it is unchanging, eternal and complete, including all facts eternally. As such we do not call it our own thought, but it is essentially identical with ours, for the Infinite is only the completion, the wholeness, of the finite, and the Eternal the truth or substance of the changing. Thus the belief in a permanent objective world, a belief as strong as the belief in our own selves, is justified, but ultimately it is only belief in an Infinite and Eternal Mind explaining all things and thoughts.

This is the modern form of the Ontological Proof in its speculative aspect, the ethical aspect, which we shall expound later on, going under a distinct name, the Moral Proof. Now, the proof just stated, if mastered in all its details, gives us a real insight into the Theism of the Upanishads, the only form of historic Theism which has clearly grasped the idea of an Infinite and Eternal Being as the explanation of finite existence. Compared with it, judged by its light, all current forms of Theism,

at any rate those with which we are familiar in this country—namely popular Christian Theism, the Deistic Monotheism of most educated Indians, the Vedic Monotheism of the Arya Samaj, the dualistic creeds derived from the Old Testament and the Koran, the popular Vaishnava forms of Theism,—are all found to be imperfect systems incapable of bridging over the chasm they have created between the Creator and creation, the Infinite and the finite. The *rishis* of the Upanishads alone, and some rare isolated spirits out of India, had the vision of the one Absolute Being who unites all the apparent differences of the world. The Ontological Proof represents this vision in a reasoned form. We have seen in our first and second lectures how the truths scattered throughout the parables and anecdotes of the Upanishads are, as it were, contributions to this proof. The insight into the unity of knowing and being, of the extended and the unextended, the temporal and the eternal, the one and the many, is to be seen there—a light broken into a variety of rays, all of which however may be focussed into the form of an argument such as I have just set forth before you. In the light of this argument creation is seen to be not an event which took place at a particular moment of time, but an eternal act, a continual self-manifestation, ever beginning, never ending, of the Eternal Spirit. Matter and finite mind,

whose apparent independence perplexes and baffles common sense Theism and leads it to conclusions which are virtually untheistic, are seen in the light of this argument to be mere appearances or abstractions which have their reality in mind and in the Infinite. In other words, it is in God alone, and not independently of God, that they are real. On the other hand, this argument shows that the Infinite itself has in it the finite—the world of sense and finite intellect—as one of its moments or aspects, and is not an abstract unity. We have seen in our previous lectures how the logic of abstract identity obscures this truth in the minds of some expounders of the Upanishads and leads them to a form of untheistic Monism, the doctrine of an Absolute Being unrelated to finite worshippers. This Absolute Monism lives in our day in an aggressive form in the movement identified with the name of Vivekānanda. I have already shown its metaphysical error. Its ethical error can be best shown and, if possible, its moral defect remedied, by a statement of what the westerners call the Moral Proof of the existence of God, a proof which directly demonstrates the existence of a God of perfect love and holiness, one whose very nature as a moral Being distinguishes him from other moral beings. This proof, therefore, I now proceed to state.

As I have already said, this proof* also, like

the one set forth immediately before it, is Ontological in character and is based on an analysis of man's moral nature, his idea of the good. Every rational being is actuated by an inherent self-love and pursues an idea of good which his nature holds before him. This idea of good never leaves him. Man always acts from an idea of good whether he interprets it rightly or wrongly. The thief and the liar, misled by temptation, take evil for good, if only for a moment. The idea of good grows both quantitatively and qualitatively with the growth of the idea of self. The individual identifies himself more or less with the members of his domestic circle, the family identifies itself with the tribe, the tribe with the nation and the nation with humanity. With the enlargement of the idea of self, self-love and the idea of the good for self also undergo a corresponding enlargement. . Again, qualitatively, the ideas of self and the good for self grow from the sensuous to the emotional, from the emotional to the intellectual, and from the intellectual to the spiritual, and higher and higher ideals of life emerge from this growth, till a perfect ideal of excellence reveals itself before the fully enlightened man. This ideal of excellence, even if conceived merely as an ideal and

* See *The Philosophy of Brāhmaism*, Lec. VIII, and *The Religion of Brahman*, Chap. IV.

an effect, requires for its sufficient cause a morally perfect person. To suppose that a Creator morally imperfect revealed an ideal of perfection to his creatures and thus made the latter hate the former, is to make him more foolish than even the most foolish of human fathers, none of whom ever wish to be hated by their children. But the 'ideal' is not a mere ideal or effect. In the higher moments of communion with God, he reveals himself directly in all his excellence as our Higher Self, and the 'ideal' manifests itself as a Person. We then rise above inference and see the Perfect One face to face. That God as revealed in man should be more than the unrevealed God, as the sceptic's doubt implies, is to say that there is more in the creature than in the Creator, which is absurd. Whether we impugn the wisdom or the moral perfection of God, we contradict ourselves in both cases and suppose the part to be greater than the whole, the effect more than the cause. Even if God were held to be possibly imperfect in wisdom and goodness, man, who is endowed with only a particle of the divine wisdom and goodness, could not in any case find out his imperfection. Doubt in the divine perfection is therefore suicidal. We cannot criticise God, cannot find fault with him, except from the standpoint of a perfection with which we for the moment identify our own nature, and this our inner nature is a surer revela-

tion of the divine nature than anything else can be. All sceptical doubt proceeds from the doubter's discounting—his forgetfulness—of his own self and the testimony it bears to God. However, as to the problem of evil, which arises in connection with the doctrine of the divine perfection, it is not possible to deal with it here except very briefly. It should be seen that evil is both metaphysically and morally necessary and therefore cannot be incompatible with the divine goodness. A world created in time can never be perfect, it can only be progressively better and better, and must therefore contain more or less of want, and so of evil, at every stage. Again, want and privation, effort and struggle, and thus pain or evil in some shape or other, are morally necessary for perfecting character. Besides, earthly life is like an arched bridge over a stream, and must appear imperfect and enigmatical. The arch can be seen as the part of a circle only by looking below the water ; so life can be seen in its completion only when looked at in its relation to immortality.

Having now given you some idea of the usual four proofs of the existence of God, the first two of which are based on the common sense dualism of matter and mind, finite and infinite, and the last two on what is called Absolute Idealism or the doctrine of unity-in-difference, and having thus supplied you with a criterion by

which you may estimate the relative value of current systems of Theism, I now proceed to give you an idea of a variety of philosophical thought which has come into prominence in the west in quite recent times and with which a certain form of Theism is connected. It is called Pluralism or Personal Idealism and is identified in England with such eminent names as Ward and McTaggart and in America with those of James, Howison and others. It holds that the universe is an assemblage of eternal souls, possibly of various grades of development, and that the progress of the world means their interrelated activity. God is either the highest of these unborn souls, helping them by his superior power and wisdom, or the principle of unity, personal or impersonal, which makes their mutual intercourse possible. The theory, in all its varieties, bears a certain resemblance to our Sāṅkhya system, specially in the Sesvara or theistic form which it assumes at the hands of Patanjali, with its doctrine of a plurality of uncreated *purushas*, assisted in their endeavours after attaining *kaivalya* by Isvara, the eternally liberated soul. But the great and important point which distinguishes the Sāṅkhya Pluralism from this western Pluralism is that while the former is realistic, postulating a non-conscious *Prakṛiti* which presents to each *puruṣa* an objective world in which he lives, moves and works

till he liberates himself from its bondage, the latter is idealistic and does not believe in any world apart from the perceptions and activities of the conscious beings who constitute the only reality it presupposes. In this respect the theory resembles the system of the Upanishads, with its doctrine of the sole causality of spirit, rather than the essentially dualistic Sāṅkhya. However, as to the unborn and uncreated character of the selves that constitute the Pluralistic reality, the nature of the proof which establishes this will be evident to those who have followed me in my first two lectures and in this as to spirit being above time and creation, absolute origination being unthinkable in its case. The reader of the Upanishads will remember the *Katha* text, “*Na jāyate mriyate vā bipāśchit, Nāyam kutāśchit na babhūva kashchit.*”—“The intelligent self is neither born nor dies; it is not born of anything else, nor does it become anything else.” That the self cannot have, properly speaking, anything outside of itself in the form of an unconscious reality, must also have been evident from the discussion we have already had in these lectures. But what strikes a thorough-going Idealist like a follower of the Upanishads or a follower of Hegel, is that the Pluralists, though they call themselves Idealists, are not quite earnest with their Idealism. The Idealistic doctrine that there cannot

be anything outside spirit, should teach an Idealist that reality is essentially one and all-inclusive and that variety or plurality is necessarily correlated to unity and not opposed to or independent of it. The Pluralist thinks that a number of independent selves acting upon one another is quite conceivable. He starts from this pre-supposition and tries to show how the instinct of self-preservation and growth inherent in each conscious unit of the world leads it to struggle, to act on and be acted on by its fellows and thus to gather experience and gain strength. To an Absolute Idealist the whole description of this growth in experience on the part of essentially independent selves,—for instance the one given in Professor Ward's *Realm of Ends*—seems little better than so much mythology. To him, as I have said in a supplementary chapter of the English version of my *Brahmajijnásá*, an individual self cannot even be conscious of himself without feeling himself, however vaguely at first, one with a Universal Self which at the same time transcends him infinitely. His self-consciousness is simply bound up with the consciousness of a Universal Life. The Pluralist therefore starts with a false assumption which is by no means a fundamental datum of experience. The individual does not—he simply cannot—start with an idea of himself as an isolated unit surrounded by other units quite distinct from

him. He starts with an idea of himself as a part of a whole—a whole which he *feels* to be conscious but only gradually *knows* and *thinks* to be so as he grows more and more reflective. When he thinks of other units like himself, he thinks of them also as parts of a whole—the same whole of which he is a part. Now, false in his start, the Pluralist is false also in the account he gives of the growth and accumulation of experience in the individual. Experience cannot grow and accumulate in a self merely individual—one whose consciousness is limited to the immediacy of time and space. Such a self, a self subject to sleep and oblivion, is incapable of conserving its momentary experiences, of uniting them and developing them into the knowledge, wisdom and strength which constitute the glory of humanity. All this implies in him the presence of something which transcends the limitations implied in individuality. Neither can a mere individual have any commerce or connection with other individuals. The Pluralist only takes such connection for granted and does not see its necessary implications. These implications are the existence of a single universal and undivided Experience and its reproduction or particularization in the form of individual experiences. If the moving of the water of a single tank causes the water of other tanks to move, or if the ringing of the bell of a single temple rings also the

bells of other temples, the tanks or the temples in question must have a bond of unity, something which is common to all of them. Infinitely deeper must be the unity which makes possible the complex and diversified relations of the social and spiritual life of humanity. And the unity underlying conscious beings must itself be conscious. But the Pluralist thinks he can do without such a unity. Professor James, who took great interest in religion, and had a deep passion and avidity for the mystical and the unusual in it, speaks in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* of a very large subliminal self as lying behind the waking life of every human self, but confesses he does not see the necessity of postulating a common universal Self behind all. If there is a God at all, he thinks that God cannot be the Absolute—he may only be a very great individual among individuals, *primus inter pares*, (chief among his peers). Professor Ward, in his book already named, arrives at a more satisfactory conclusion. In the earlier parts of his book he attempts to construct a purely pluralistic universe, with the activities, individual and combined, of its component parts. But as he proceeds, and has done with his criticism of the ordinary theistic conceptions of a world governed by fixed laws under an all-seeing and perfectly good God, he by and by sees that after all the theistic interpretation of the

universe is far more reasonable than the pluralistic one. Gradually therefore he comes to attribute to God all the perfections which ordinary Theists believe in, though he does so more on grounds of faith than on those of pure Reason.

Now, as to that form of Pluralism which believes only in an unconscious unity of spirits, and which in England is identified with the name of Dr. John McTaggart of Cambridge, an eminent exponent of the Hegelian philosophy, I might leave it unnoticed in my lecture as not a variety of Theism. But Dr. McTaggart's atheism is more apparent than real. In fact it seems to me a much deeper Theism than many forms of thought claiming the name. Those who have followed me so far in my exposition of the Theism of the Upanishads must see that what each one of us calls his individual self is a reproduction or manifestation, under the limitations of time and space, of a Self which is universal and transcends these limitations. Each self then, as knowing its own limitations and knowing also the Unlimited as its true and total Self, has both a finite and an infinite aspect. Besides that portion of the universe which each of us experiences in his individual life, he knows there is a wider, a boundless, world existing in relation to that very Self which each of us calls

his own. In its universal and infinite aspect, we, Theists, call the Self 'God'; in its individual and finite aspect we call it 'man.' In its infinite aspect we cannot but think of the Self as one and undivided, since in that aspect it comprehends the whole of reality. But the unity is unthinkable apart from the plurality. We cannot say with the Mâyávádin that the unity alone is real, *páramásthika*, and the plurality only apparent, *vyávahárika*. An absolute unity without difference could not even apparently or temporarily differentiate itself into plurality. The unity and the plurality must therefore be both held as real. Now this is the substance of Dr. McTaggart's reasoning in establishing his doctrine of a plurality of eternal selves, a reasoning with which no idealistic Theist could have any real quarrel. But what Dr. McTaggart does over and above this, is to emphasise the plurality at the expence of the unity. In making this unity impersonal or unconscious he makes it meaningless and thus virtually denies it. As we have already seen, the intercourse of self with self is possible only on the condition of each having in it something which transcends its limitations and includes also the other, and this something cannot but be a larger Self than the communicating selves. We have also seen that an individual can know and conceive the whole of reality only on the condition of

the whole existing in him as his very self and that reality cannot be anything apart from spirit. All this proves that the unity of the world cannot be a mere abstract or impersonal unity, but must be a Personal Unity, an Infinite Person, who is at once the universe—‘*Sarvan khalu idam Brahma*,’—and the Inner Self of all creatures, *Sarvabhútántarátmá*. As Dr. H. Halдар, in his essay on *Hegelianism and Human Personality*, says in criticising Dr. McTaggart’s view : “ Each particular self, in so far as it contains everything, is identical with the Supreme Reality within which everything falls. Its consciousness, as all-embracing, must coincide with the Supreme Reality, and the Supreme Reality, on its part, must therefore coincide with its consciousness and hence be conscious. I do not see how it is possible to evade this conclusion. A particular differentiation of the Absolute, as a finite determinate thing, excludes all others, but it includes everything, not in its own strength, but in virtue of the identity of its all-embracing consciousness with the Ultimate Reality, which cannot consequently be other than consciousness. The conception of a particular self ideally including everything becomes tenable only on the supposition that the inclusion is real, and if the ideal inclusion is conscious inclusion, so the real inclusion must also be.” And as Dr. Halдар says briefly in another

place in the same essay, "Once touched with self-consciousness at a particular point, where, be it remembered, it (the Absolute) is completely personal, how can it ever shake it off? So, if the Absolute is a person in me, it must itself have personality."

We now see the most important forms of Theism current among and about us. If we are really earnest with Theism, if it is an object of deep study and zealous endeavour with us, we must try to enter into the spirit and essence of everyone of its various forms, judge their relative merits and defects and while giving our whole-hearted adhesion to the one which commends itself to us as the best, do the others the justice of a close study and of forming a clear idea of the errors inherent in them which have led us to reject them. May the Divine Spirit be with us in our earnest and reverent study and lead us to the truth as it is in him !

LECTURE V

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

In undertaking to lecture on the religious aspect of Hegel's philosophy, I do not mean to say that his religion can be separated from his philosophy. As Wallace, the English translator of Hegel's *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, says in his preface to Hegel's *Logic*, "In ordinary moods of mind there is a long way from Logic to Religion. But almost every page of what Hegel has called Logic is witness to the belief in their ultimate identity. It was no new principle of later years for him." And the reason for this is that to Hegel God is the All-in-all. In article 32 of the work referred to he says, "Common fancy puts the Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it." Nevertheless, though Hegel's religion and philosophy are inseparable, and the one cannot be understood without understanding the other, I think it is possible to speak on the latter with comparative brevity and of the former more

fully, and this is what I mean to do in this and the succeeding lecture.

I begin with the common sense view of the three faculties of the mind,—sense, understanding and faith,—by which, it is believed, we know three kinds of objects, matter, scientific truths and supersensuous realities. This view is accepted even by some philosophers, specially our Hindu philosophers, according to whom there are three *pramānas* or sources of knowledge, *pratyaksha* (sense), *anumāna* (inference) and *śabda* (scripture). By ‘*śabda*’ our philosophers mean the spiritual insight of the *rishis*, an insight which every one following their methods of spiritual culture may share in. Kant shows that sense, understanding and unifying Reason (his name or substitute for faith) are not three independent sources of three different kinds of knowledge, but really three elements which together constitute knowledge. But in rejecting the theory of the faculties, humourously called the “window theory,” because it pictures the mind as a room into which light comes from different directions through different windows, Kant was not quite successful in avoiding its associations, for his language sometimes favours the idea that these elements of knowledge are not only distinguishable, but separable and come from independent sources. Hegel fully rises above the theory of the faculties and the *pramā-*

nas. To him the mind is one, its power of knowing one, and its object also, the sole object of its knowledge, God, one. In all acts of knowledge, by whatever name we may call them, we are always in presence of the Absolute. Nevertheless the popular distinctions are to him not quite meaningless, though they have a different meaning to him than the accepted one. To him the so-called 'faculties' or '*pramānas*' are so many stages of knowledge in which the same object, the Absolute, appears in various forms or rather degrees of clearness. In what is called sensuous perception, the lowest stage of knowledge, in which, however, the higher stages are implicitly present, reality appears as a world of things in space and events in time independent of one another. Neither their external nor their internal differences and relations are clearly seen. In the second stage, called the understanding or the scientific intellect, these differences and relations disclose themselves, but the ultimate unity underlying them, though implicitly present, is not clearly seen. In the third stage, that of Reason, this unity clearly reveals itself. Some idea of this doctrine, that the apparently different kinds of knowledge,—sensuous, intellectual and spiritual,—are all inseparably connected and are really one, can be had from the following considerations. I can have no knowledge of the book before me without a know-

ledge of my self as its knower. My seeing or touching this book therefore is not mere sensuous knowledge, the supersensuous knowledge of my self being inextricably mixed up with it. Things seen, heard, touched, smelled and tasted can be known only in relation to a self which sees, hears, touches, smells and tastes. The converse also is true, namely that the subject of seeing, hearing, touching, smelling and tasting can be known only in relation to the objects of these acts of knowing. Again, you cannot know this book without locating it in a particular part of infinite space. In the same way, you cannot know the sounds I am producing without thinking of them as in time—infinite time. Lastly, in our knowledge of a world in space and time, the idea of a Mind in relation to which this world exists and which yet transcends it, for it can neither be extended nor flowing like it, is present as the very condition of thought and knowledge. We are not indeed always conscious of these implications of knowledge, but they are nevertheless present in it and come out clearly when we closely analyse any act of knowledge. Such analysis shows the error of the popular division of faculties and the division of *pramānas* in our native philosophy.

For a proper introduction to western philosophy in general and to the philosophy of Hegel in particular, it is necessary to see clearly the

distinction between sensation and conception, a distinction foreign to unreflective common sense, and one not at all clearly explained in current books on Hindu philosophy. Sensation or feeling, to begin with, is particular, while conception is universal. Your pleasure or pain, your feeling of red or blue, heat or cold, cannot be shared by me, but your conceptions of these are the common property of all intelligent beings. That the book before us is red and hard, can be understood by all intelligences. And this understanding implies a self in us which understands,—which, as a universal, takes cognisance of and thus unites all particulars. Conceptions, it will be found, are only powers put forth by this self, the manifestations of its inherent nature. Mark secondly, that our sensations are all fleeting, flowing in time, while our conceptions and the self of which they are powers, are persistent and above the flow of time. Every time I look at or touch this book and shut my eyes or take away my hand from the book, my feeling of redness or hardness changes, while the conceptions of redness and hardness remain unchanged, and even though disappearing in oblivion or sleep, reappear in memory and re-awakening and thus show their permanence. Again, while what we call objects of sense are in space, external to one another, conceptions, that is the powers of the conceiving mind, are

unspatial, above space. The mind which conceives things as here and there, far and near, is neither here nor there, neither far nor near. It is the source of these distinctions and do not fall under them. Finally, while sensation is manifold, conception or the conceiving mind, which makes the many its objects of thought, is one, undivided. We may indeed think of many conceiving minds or selves knowing a common world and knowing one another. But this very thought of a common object of many minds and their commerce in knowledge and action with one another implies an all-inclusive Mind which enters into "all thinking things and all objects of all thought" and which therefore is infinite. Sensation and conception are thus distinguished as particular and universal, unified and unifier, temporal and eternal, spatial and unspatial, manifold and one, finite and infinite. But their distinction or difference is based on relation or unity. The one without the other is an abstraction. They are a unity-in-difference.

In the proposition "This book is red" redness is a conception. But redness is only a variety of colour, which therefore is a more primary conception than redness. But colour itself is a derivative conception. It is only one of many properties inherent in a substance. In ordinary thinking we do not go behind the correlative conceptions of substance and property.

We may therefore regard them as primary. The question now arises, How many primary conceptions are thus implied in our knowledge? Can we enumerate them exhaustively? And if we can, what method is competent to do so? Kant thought that he had found the clue to such a method in Formal Logic, which professes to be the science of thinking, that is, of the allied activities of conceiving, judging and inferring. The Logicians, as Kant understands them, or rather as he dresses up their doctrine, divide judgments into four classes, each including three kinds. They are (1) judgments of quantity, namely universal, particular and singular judgments, (2) those of quality, namely affirmative, negative and infinite judgments, (3) those of relation, namely categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, and (4) those of modality, namely problematic, assertoric and apodictic judgments. Kant finds that these twelve kinds of judgments imply twelve conceptions or "categories" of the understanding, namely unity, plurality and totality under quantity; reality, negation, and limitation under quality; substance and accident, cause and effect, and action and reaction under relation; and possibility, existence and necessity under modality. These forms of the understanding all deal with sensuous matter and are therefore valid in knowledge; but there are three ideas of reason—those of the soul, the world as a

totality of phenomena and God, the all-comprehending Being,—which point to a supersensuous region, and about the objective validity of which theoretic reason cannot pronounce any judgment; but our moral experiences testify to the reality of the objects indicated by them. Now, Hegel was not satisfied with the procedure followed by Kant in discovering the primary conceptions underlying our knowledge. It seemed to him artificial and haphazard. His method, called the Dialectical, is given in his *Logic*, which is the foundation of his system of philosophy. Though apparently a very different method from Kant's, which is called the Critical, it may be said to be a correction of or improvement on the same. The three elements of knowledge distinguished by Kant and ascribed to three sources, appear in Hegel, as we have already seen, as three *stages* of knowledge. They are called, in the language of the *Logic*, Being, Essence and Notion. Kant's deduction of the third category in each division from a union or synthesis of the first and the second, for instance totality from a synthesis of unity and plurality, is the very essence of the Dialectical Method. Hegel goes back to the most abstract conception which the human mind can form, that of Pure Being without any particular determinations, and by showing that each idea leads to its contrary and then to one in which the contraries are

unified, at last rises to the Absolute Idea or idea of God, which alone is without contradiction and fully satisfies Reason. All other ideas, being more or less contradictory, are only provisionally true. The idea of a triad or trinity governs Hegel's thought everywhere. In the stages of thought and the divisions of the Logic it is Being, Essence and Notion; in the movement of thought at every stage it is thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, or unity, difference and unity-in-difference; in the evolution of nature, it is matter, life and consciousness; and in religion it is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Hegel's Logic exists in two forms, first as a separate work and secondly in an abridged form as the first part of the *Encyclopædia*. As I have already said, it is the foundation of his system, and must be read by all who would enter into his philosophy. But Logic, in so far as it ignores the sensuous matter of knowledge and deals only with conceptions, is an abstract science. This abstractness disappears in Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, *Philosophy of Mind* and *Philosophy of Religion*. The Absolute Idea of the Logic appears in the last-mentioned work as the Absolute Spirit. Hegel has also written on the Philosophy of Law and Art. In my present lecture I shall deal specially with his Philosophy of Religion. On some former occasion I told my hearers in the form of a dream my relations with

our indigenous philosophy and the philosophy of the west. The essence, the deepest purport, of the former seems to me quite true, but I find no clear method in it. If there ever was a method in it in the constructive age of our intellectual life, it seems to have been lost in the degenerate age that followed. Our philosophy is like a hill overgrown with jungle through which no pathway can be seen. Hegel's Dialectical Method is like a lantern which shows the way to the top of the hill, where sit the *rishis* worshipping and discoursing on the Absolute, with whom we are one and from whom we are at the same time different. As they say, '*Tadantar asya sarvasya tadu sarvasyáśya báhyatah*,'—'He is within all this, and also beyond all this.' Hegel seems to make it clear in what sense this is true.

Now, to return to the three stages in knowledge or experience which Hegel calls Being, Essence and Notion. They are really what we call the popular, scientific and speculative stages respectively, of knowledge. In the first, things are thought of as existing by themselves, independently of one another. Neither their external nor their internal relations,—their relations with one another and the differences implied in their unity—are clearly seen. Thus this table is conceived by unreflective people as existing by itself and not depending for its existence on anything else. This idea of self-existence is essen-

tially true. There is really a self-existing Reality not depending on anything else for its existence ; but the table as a table is not that Reality. The table could not exist except in distinction from and relation to other things. In the very idea of the table as a table, the existence of other things is implied. The idea of what the table is, contains as an essential factor the idea of what it is *not*. The idea ' The table is ' is not therefore as simple and positive an idea as unreflective people think. As has been pointed out already, every object in space implies infinite space and the idea of space as infinite involves a contradiction. One point of space leads on to another, and so on indefinitely, and at each step you have only a finite and no real infinite. In fact all conceptions in popular thought involve contradictions and thus show that it deals, not with concrete realities, as it supposes, but with abstractions. If from the external relations of the table we turn to its internal relations, we shall see that they also involve contradictions and show that they are based on abstract and not concrete thinking. The table is composed of parts and these parts again of smaller parts and so on till we come to the idea of indivisible atoms, which is palpably contradictory, for space or extension, however small, must be divisible. Again, if we rise from the popular to the scientific stage of thought, that also will be found to

involve oppositions which cannot be harmonised. For instance, if we take the idea of the table as a substance with a number of properties inhering in it,—its colour, its smoothness, its hardness, its shape and size, &c.—it will be found that this reduplication of the thing into an identity and its differences serves us almost as little as popular ideas in understanding its true nature. The identity apart from the differences is a mere abstraction, and so are the differences apart from the identity. If, again, we think of an event and its cause, for instance the burning of a piece of paper by fire, we shall see that the force which we conceive as the cause of the phenomenon is only an abstraction apart from its manifestations, and that cause and effect are inseparable, the effect determining the cause as much as the cause does the effect. The conceptions of science are thus as much abstractions as those of popular thought and fail to give us real knowledge of things. Even mental science, which deals with knowledge itself, is vitiated by abstractions—irreconcilable divisions—and fails to present to us reality as it truly is. This science draws a sharp distinction between mind and matter, subject and object, knowing and willing, freedom and necessity, and so on, and fails to show how these opposed facts are related, as they surely are. This is seen only when we rise to the level of speculative thought,—of the logic of compre-

hension. Then subject and object, knowledge and will, necessity and freedom, the universal and the particular, the finite and the infinite,—in fact all the divisions of popular and scientific thought—are seen to be reconciled in the Absolute Idea—God or the Supreme Spirit—who exists in himself and has nothing beyond him, who differentiates himself in the multiplicity of aspects which science presents to us, and who at the same time remains the same with himself in the midst of these differences. This is what Hegel shows in his Logic, but he does it in a way of which nothing but the faintest and most imperfect idea could be conveyed by the hurried sketch I have given. It has been thought that the intricacies of the Logic may be avoided and the Absolute reached by an easier and more direct path by the student of Theology. *The Philosophy of Religion* proves this in a manner, and to that book I shall refer in these lectures more than to any other written by Hegel. One word more, however, in regard to Hegel's method. In our native philosophy, Rámánuja's able refutation of Sankara's Máyá theory in his *Srí Bháshya* contains hints—only hints, nothing more—of a dialectical method. But these hints would not probably be intelligible to us if we were not acquainted with the method in its developed form in Hegel's philosophy. Perhaps this is true also of other works on Hindu philosophy.

Their suggestiveness to us is due to our having received instruction in a foreign school. I attach great importance to this instruction and to the method it has taught us. This method must be applied to the interpretation of our higher scriptures if such interpretation is to bear any good fruits. A wrong method of interpreting them has led and is still leading to disastrous results—to the subversion of all true faith in religion and of all practical religion of a sound and healthy character. The logic of mere identity leads on the one hand to Agnosticism and on the other to Idolatry. The religion of the Upanishads admits of a better interpretation, but Hegel does not see this. In his review and criticism of the chief systems of historical religion in his *Philosophy of Religion*, he classes it with mere Pantheism and otherwise does great injustice to it. He extols Christianity and identifies it with the Absolute Religion. Hegel's Christianity is not however the Christianity of the New Testament, pure and simple. It is a philosophical doctrine more or less allied to the Neo-Platonism which arose contemporaneously with Christianity, opposed it for a time and was then merged in it. Hegel's interpretation of the Trinity is purely metaphysical and can be accepted by Christians and Non-Christians alike. Hegelianism, though dead or almost dead in the country of its birth, is alive in England and

America. Great thinkers like Bradley, Bosanquet, McTaggart and Royce either accept this philosophy or are deeply influenced by it. The same is true of that small number of thinkers in the Bráhma Samáj who are re-thinking the problem of religion from the modern standpoint. In the writings and utterances of Drs. Seal and Haldar this influence is unmistakable. In the work done in connection with the Theological Society of the Sádharan Bráhma Samáj during the last few years, our debt to Hegel and his English and American followers has been freely and frequently acknowledged, though we have also paid the due share of honour to the philosophy of our own country. The philosophy as well as the religion of the coming generation will no doubt owe its life and strength largely to a fusion of eastern and western thought.

LECTURE VI

HEGEL'S VIEW OF THEISM AND CHRISTIANITY

Kant, it is well-known to students of philosophy, tried to show in his *Kritic of Pure Reason* that the traditional proofs of the existence of God were of little value, vitiated by fallacies, and incompetent to give us a true knowledge of the Absolute. It is also well-known that Hegel, in his lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, forming the last part of his *Philosophy of Religion*, criticises Kant's criticism of these proofs and tries to restore them to their positions as "forms of the elevation of the spirit to God (p. 233).^{*} Of these proofs the Ontological, that from the thought of God to his being, is regarded by him as the only true one (p. 361), and the others, the Cosmological and the Teleological, though containing elements of truth, as only leading to the Ontological, or rather resting on it as a prop. Kant's inability to appreciate the value of these proofs is due to his failure to see the limitations of the logic of the understand-

^{*} This and all other quotations from the book in this lecture are taken from its English translation by Messrs, Speirs and Sanderson.

ing and to rise to the true logic of comprehension. I hope you will see more clearly as we proceed than you perhaps do at present what this really means. The Cosmological Proof proceeds upon the finite nature of the world and the individual mind and tries to rise to the Infinite. The finitude of nature may appear in various forms,—its contingency, its limitation to particular time and space, its character as an effect, and so on, and from all these a passage is sought to an infinite, eternal and necessary Cause. The form in which Kant states this proof is as follows ; I quote from Hegel : “ If *anything exists*—not merely *exists*, but exists a *contingentia mundi*, is defined as *contingent*—then some absolutely necessary Essence must exist as well. Now, I myself at least exist, and therefore an absolutely rational Essence exists.” (p. 240). The substance of Kant’s criticism of the proof is that there is no real passage from the finite to the Infinite. While the finite is *in* experience, the Infinite is *beyond* experience. We have only a conception, not an experience, of the Infinite, and from conception to actual existence we cannot logically pass. Hegel answers that the finite apart from the Infinite is only an abstract and negative idea, and not a concrete and affirmative one, and that the region of non-sensuous thought is not one beyond experience, but something in which we actually live, move and have our

being. "If thought cannot," says he, "pass beyond the world of sense, would it not be necessary, on the other hand, to show first of all how it is conceivable that thought can enter (as it really does) into the world of sense?" (p. 247) Again: "The essential and formal defect in the Cosmological Proof (as ordinarily stated) consists in the fact that finite Being is not only taken directly as the beginning and starting point, but is regarded as something true, something affirmative, with an existence of its own. All those forms of reflection referred to, such as the presupposed, the conditioned, causality, have this in common, that what forms the presupposition, the condition, the effect, are taken as affirmative, and the connection is not conceived as a transition which it essentially is.....The proposition which ought to constitute the major proposition of the syllogism must accordingly take the following form rather. The Being of the finite is not its own Being, but is, on the contrary, the Being of its Other, namely the Infinite. Or to put it otherwise, Being which is characterised as finite possesses this characteristic only in the sense that it cannot exist independently in relation to the Infinite, but is, on the contrary, ideal merely, a moment of the Infinite. Consequently the minor proposition: the finite *is*—disappears in any affirmative sense, and if we may still say it exists, we mean that its existence is merely

an appearance or phenomenal existence. It is just the fact that the finite world is merely a manifestation or appearance which constitutes the absolute power of the Infinite." (pp. 259, 260). Both the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Religion* abound with passages distinguishing the true from the false Infinite,—showing the distinction between the interminable progress from one thing to another which is falsely taken as the Infinite, and the true Infinite, that is Thought or Spirit, which, in positing or conceiving another as its object,—which it continually does by its inherent nature—really never goes out of itself, but is self-contained and all-comprehending, and therefore the true Infinite. I shall however return to the subject and deal more fully with it in speaking of Hegel's exposition of the Ontological Proof.

But before that we must consider the Teleological Proof. This proof is based on the marks of design,—the adaptation of means to ends,—which we see in nature. The animal body, with its various limbs and organs serving different purposes, is full of such marks. What we call inorganic nature—light, heat, air, water, etc.—serves the growth and perpetuation of life. This relation of means and ends is not the work of the things or animals in which it is found. It points to a Supreme Intelligence as its Cause. Kant's chief objection to this argument is that if it proves

anything it proves only a great Mechanic and not a Creator. In the divine adaptation of matter to serve the purposes of life by giving it different forms, the existence of matter is presupposed; it is therefore not proved that matter itself is created. Hegel's criticism of this objection proceeds upon the view that the difference of form and matter on which Kant's objection is based is a purely imaginary difference, as mere matter or substance without form is inconceivable. The activity, therefore, which is implied in adapting matter to the ends of life not only gives particular forms to matter, but creates it. As Hegel says: "Is this distinction, this separation between form and matter, admissible, and can we thus put each specially by itself? It has been shown, on the contrary, in the *Logic* (*Encyclop. Phil.* Art. 129) that formless matter is a non-entity, a pure abstraction of the understanding, which we may certainly construct, but which ought not to be given out to be anything true. The matter which is opposed to God as something unalterable is simply a product of reflection, or, to put it otherwise, this identity of formlessness, this continuous unity of matter, is itself one of the specific qualities of form.....The activity of God himself, his simple unity with himself, the form, is matter." (*Lectures on the Proof of God's Existence*, p. 334).

As the separation of matter and form dis-

appears by the application of the dialectical method to the distinction, so does that of matter and life and even of end and means. The conception of matter serving the purposes of life is a product of abstract thought. How could matter do so unless it had, in its very nature, the adaptability, the potentiality, of doing so,—unless, in other words, it were ultimately one with life? Popular thought separates the means from the end, and thus sees only finitude in the matter. “The truth of this relation, however,” as Hegel says, “is not anything of this kind. On the contrary, the truth is in the teleological activity which is means and matter in itself, a teleological activity which accomplishes its ends through itself. This is what is meant by the infinite activity of the end. The end accomplishes itself, realises itself, through its own activity, and thus comes into harmony with itself in the process of realising itself. The finitude of the end consists, as we saw, in the separableness of means and material. Viewed thus, the end represents what is as yet a technical mode of action. The truth of the determination of the end consists in the fact that the end has within itself its means, as also the material in which it realises itself.” (p. 335.) The true relation of the organic to the inorganic, of life to matter, is really that of the subject to the object. The relation implies a unity which transcends the distinction.

And this unity is the subject itself making and thereby overlapping the distinction in which it stands to the object and thus proving itself to be truly infinite, having nothing beyond it. As Hegel says in the same paragraph from which I have already quoted, "Life as the subject is the soul. This latter is the end, that is, it posits itself, realises itself, and thus the product is the same as the thing that produces." (p. 336.) Elsewhere he says : "The organic is, in its formal aspect, and by its very nature, something which exists in accordance with the end. It is means and end, and is therefore something infinite in itself. It is an end which returns back into itself ; and even regarded as something dependent on what is outside of it, it has the character of an end, and consequently represents what is truly first in comparison with what has been termed the immediate, in comparison, that is, with Nature. This immediacy is merely one-sided determination, and ought to be brought down to the level of something that is merely posited (*i.e.*, conceived.) This is the true relation. Man (*i.e.*, the intelligence which is in man) is not an accident added on to what is first ; but, on the contrary, the organic is itself what is first. The inorganic has in it merely the semblance of Being." (p. 341.)

The Teleological Proof, since it is based on the idea of means and ends, naturally leads to

the question of relative and absolute ends, and to that of the supreme end of creation. The growth and development of the various forms of life seen in the world are evidently only relative ends and therefore rather means than ends. The higher forms of life feed upon the lower, and man uses all animals lower than he for his own life and comfort. Even much higher things like civic life, the splendid civilization, for instance, of ancient nations, are subject to destruction. "We are here," says Hegel, "certainly forced to rise to the thought of a higher determination and a higher end when we thus lament the misfortune which has befallen so much that is of high value, and mourn its disappearance. We must regard all those ends, however much they interest us, as finite and subordinate, and ascribe to their finitude the destruction which overtakes them." (P. 345.) "The supreme end," Hegel continues on the same page, "is the Good, the general final-end of the world. Reason has to regard this end as the absolute final-end of the world, and must look upon it as being based purely on the essential nature of reason, beyond which Spirit cannot go." But the Good—moral good—can exist only in conflict with evil. At any rate this would seem to be the case in regard to the finite nature of man. "It would thus be necessary," says Hegel, to postulate the perpetual existence of the enemy, of what is opposed

to the Good." (p. 346.) Hegel ends with this uncertain note in the lecture from which the above extracts are made. Teleology cannot take us farther than this. To it moral perfection is only an idea, sufficient perhaps for guidance, but never realised in actual life. Even the divine perfection is only morally and not metaphysically certain. It is only the Ontological Proof that establishes the actual existence of a perfect Being and man's ultimate unity with him. When this is seen, man's moral progress ceases, according to Hegel, to be an endless effort, and he attains absolute liberation, becomes sinless. This is taught in the third part of the *Philosophy of Religion*, not in the lectures on the proofs of the existence of God, with which we have so far been dealing. The subject is a difficult one, and I do not mean to fully discuss it here. I have referred to it briefly, as it naturally arises from a discussion of Teleology, the theory of means and ends. I close with an extract from the lengthy discussion of the point in the part mentioned: "The battle is past, and man is conscious that it is not a case of battle, as it is in the Persian religion or the Kantian Philosophy, in which evil is indeed to be overcome, but in which it confronts the Good in virtue of its own essential nature, and in which infinite progress is what is highest of all. If we get no further than the idea of what ought to be, then effort

becomes endless, and the solution of the problem is removed infinitely far away. Here, on the contrary, the contradiction is already implicitly solved; evil is known as something which in the spiritual is virtually and absolutely overcome, and in virtue of the fact of its being thus overcome, the subject has only to make its will good, and evil, the evil action, disappears." (P. 129, 130.)

We now come to the Ontological Proof, which tries to establish the reality of God on our idea of him. It was Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who first made the attempt. Hegel states Anselm's argument in the following way : " The idea of God is that he is absolutely perfect. If accordingly we think of God only as idea, then we find that what is merely subjective, and merely represented in the form of an idea, is defective, and not perfect ; for that is the more perfect which is not merely represented as an idea, but also *is*, really is. Therefore, since God is most perfect, he is not idea merely, but, on the contrary, he is possessed of actuality or reality." (Pp. 353, 354). To this argument it was quite easy for Kant to object that the being of God followed as little from the idea of God as the existence of a hundred thalers in his pocket followed from the idea of them in his mind. Nevertheless Kant missed the point of the argument by placing ordinary sense-ideas like that

of thalers on the same level with the idea of the Perfect Being. The misunderstanding, however, is mostly due to the form in which Anselm put the argument. The later and more rational form given to it is untouched by Kant's criticism. This form is based on the doctrine of the ultimate unity of subject and object, of thinking and being. The idea of God is the idea of a Thought, Mind or Person who includes everything—beyond whom there is and can be nothing. It can be shown by a close analysis of all forms of knowledge that the idea of such a Being lies at their very basis, and that *here*, in the relation of subject and object, idea or knowing is identical with being, because the knower himself is, in his essence, the being or existence he thinks of. '*Cogito ergo sum*'—I *know*, therefore I *am*. Here knowing and being are identical. All knowledge and reality are only manifestations of this ultimate unity of knowing and being; but unreflective people do not see this. Hegel's statement of the proof in his lectures on the proof of God's existence is not always clear, at any rate to the ordinary reader unfamiliar with the technicalities of his philosophy. However, I quote here a passage which, if reflected upon, may give light to such a reader. "The Notion,"—that is the idea of the Perfect Being, says Hegel,—“has not being in itself potentially only. It is not seen to be there (*i.e.* as having

real being) *by us*; but on the contrary, the Notion is actual Being, Being for itself also. It abolishes its subjectivity and objectifies itself..... In perception, feeling, etc., we have outward objects before us; but we take them up into ourselves (*i.e.*, into knowledge) and thus the objects are ideal in us (*i.e.*, essentially related to our knowledge.) The Notion (*i.e.*, the idea of the perfect 'all-comprehending Being') is thus the continuous act whereby it abolishes its difference (of 'inner' and 'outer'). When we regard closely the nature of the Notion, we see that this identity with Being is no longer a presupposition, but a result (*i.e.*, an actual fact). The course of procedure is as follows: the Notion makes itself objective, turns itself into reality, and is thus the truth, the unity of subject and object. God is an immortal living Being, says Plato, whose body and soul (*i.e.*, Nature and Spirit) are united in one. Those who separate the two sides do not get beyond what is finite and untrue." (Pp. 364, 365.)

The following from the first part of the *Philosophy of Religion* is perhaps far more clear. It shows, briefly, in untechnical language, how consciousness rises from the distinction of subject and object to a synthetic unity—to the Absolute. Hegel says:—"I relate myself to an object, and then contemplate it as it is.

The object, which I at once distinguish from myself, is independent (*i.e.*, independent of my mere subjectivity); I have not made it, it did not wait for me in order to exist, and it remains although I go away from it. Both I and the object are therefore two independent things, but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things to each other, a relation in which they appear as one. In that I have knowledge of the object,—these two, I and the other, exist for me in this my simple determinate character. If we rightly grasp what takes place here, we have not only the negative result that the oneness and independence of the two is done away with. The annulling which takes place is not only empty negation, but a negation of those two things from which I started. The non-existence here is thus only the non-existence in which both determinations are abrogated, yet preserved and ideally contained." (Pp. 107, 108). In other words, while the subject and the object in knowledge appear at first sight to be two realities independent of each other, they, on a closer view, disclose themselves to be so closely related—related in consciousness—that they are seen to be two only ideally, that is, in thought, and not in reality; the distinction nevertheless,—the distinction in thought—remains and does not pass away, as it is said to do in the Identity Philosophy of Spi-

noza, Schelling and Sankara. The really independent, that is, self-existent Reality is the conscious Unity which constitutes at once the distinction and the relation of subject and object. While the latter are finite, the former is Infinite.

The necessity of distinction—what Hegel often calls “mediation”—in thought and knowledge is put even more clearly in the following passage than in the one I have just quoted. “If for instance,” says he, “we consider a perception, we see that I am the knowledge, the perception, and that further there is an Other, an object; or, if it is not conceived of as objective, but as subjective, there is at least some determinateness or conscious state present for me. In sensation, I am thus mediated only by means of the object, by means of the definite character of my sensation. It is always a content; two elements go to the making of it. Knowledge is absolutely simple, but I must know something; if I am mere knowledge (the *jñānamātram* of our *Máyávādins*) I know nothing at all. Pure knowledge may be called immediate, it is simple; but if knowledge be actual, be real, we have then what knows and what is known, we have relation and mediacy.” (p. 164).

The Ontological Proof, when rightly grasped, gives a form of Theism very different from popular dualistic Theism. It gives us a God who is not merely *believed* to be *in us* in a

vague unintelligible sense, but who is actually *known* to be identical with our consciousness. The finite as merely finite cannot know the Infinite; it is only in its identity with the latter that the former knows it. As Hegel says, (p. 154) "I am the absolutely concrete Ego, thought determining itself in itself; I exist as the Notion (that is, the Absolute Idea or Spirit)." But this identity is not the bare undifferentiated identity of Absolute Monism. It is an identity or unity in difference. As I have already shown by an extract from Hegel, all knowledge involves mediation or distinction. Our knowledge of God, therefore, inasmuch as it is knowledge, necessarily involves distinction. And Hegel expressly says so. "Knowledge," he says, "is relation within itself, it is mediated; either mediated through what is Other than itself or within itself, but it is mediation, because in it the reference of myself to an object takes place—a reference to God, who is an 'Other.' I and God are different from one another; if both were one, there would then be immediate relation, free from any mediation,—relationless unity, that is to say, unity without differentiation. Because the two are different, One is not what the Other is; if, however, they are related, if they have identity at the same time with their difference, then this identity is itself different from their difference." (Pp. 166, 167).

This proof establishes not only the metaphysical perfection of God, that is, his infinitude and eternity, his omnipotence and omniscience, but also his moral perfection, his perfect love and holiness. But Hegel's opinion on this latter subject can be clearly understood only when we have grasped his doctrine of Trinity, and his view of worship. Hegel thinks that all forms of religion which have not risen to a comprehension of the doctrine of Trinity are illogical, imperfect, and incompetent to raise man to the highest spirituality. But, as I have already said, his idea of the Trinity is a philosophical doctrine, not necessarily connected with historical Christianity. It is, in a sense, pre-Christian, and can exist without any connection with the teachings of Jesus Christ.

Let us see what it is. In considering it we must remember how Hegel reaches God, the Infinite, the Absolute. The true Infinite is not anything beyond or outside the finite, it is implied in it. It is that which includes everything—beyond which there is nothing. It is Consciousness, which differentiates itself into two finites, the subject and the object, but in this very act of distinguishing relates and unites them and thus reveals itself as the true Infinite, being in-and-for-itself, independent, not related to anything beyond itself and comprehending everything in itself. Time and space are not be-

yond but within it—forms which it assumes, but which it also transcends. Finite consciousness, that is consciousness conceived as limited in time and space, is also included in it, being an appearance of which it is the reality, or a reproduction of which it is the original.

Thus the subject and the object, the finite and the Infinite, are not distinct and independent realities, but related aspects of the same Reality. As related, they are one and yet different. Now, this is what the understanding, the mere logic of exclusion, cannot comprehend. It takes all distinctions as divisions. To it unity is only unity,—bare identity,—and difference only difference,—separation and division,—and there can be no such thing as unity-in-difference. To it a doctrine like the Trinity—the unity-in-difference of Father, Son and Holy Spirit—is a most irrational doctrine. As Hegel says, “Those who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity are men who are guided merely by their senses and understanding.” (*Philosophy of Religion* Vol. III. p. 19.) They say they can conceive an Infinite Being existing in and for itself without relation to anything else and without any internal relation. This is Absolute Monism, in which there is no room for an objective world or for finite intelligences, and in which they are set down as merely illusory. The understanding, in its popular form, believes in material things and finite

minds and infers a God who has created them, but who is noway one with them. According to Hegel neither the God of Monism nor that of Dualism is the true Infinite. Finite and Infinite are relative terms, and therefore an Infinite without relation to the finite is not only not the true Infinite, but is really meaningless. As Hegel says, "Without the world God is not God." (Vol. I. p. 200.) The God of Dualism, as outside the finite and not including it, is limited by it and therefore a finite God. In Hegel's opinion all religions rejecting the Trinity are vitiated by this logic of exclusion, which sees only the distinction, but not the unity, of things. The doctrine of the Trinity, which is guided by Reason or the logic of comprehension, alone sees unity in difference and difference in unity and is the only Absolute Religion.

Hegel's Trinity is not the doctrine of three Gods, but an exposition of three related aspects in the divine nature—the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. This triune nature of God is revealed not merely to a chosen Son or a small number of apostles, but to all who rise to the point of view of true Reason. The insight into consciousness as the true Infinite, with its two finite moments of subject and object, is the manifestation of God as the Holy Spirit to and in us. The finite intelligence, as an Other to whom God reveals himself, but who is nevertheless

one with him, is the Son. But God exists even before or irrespectively of his manifestation to finite intelligence, containing it and the objective world within himself in an unmanifested form. As such he is the Father. "The three forms indicated are," says Hegel, "eternal Being in and with itself, the form of Universality (the Father); the form of manifestation or appearance, that of particularisation, Being for another (the Son); the form of the return from appearance into itself, absolute singleness or individuality (the Holy Spirit)." (Vol. III. p. 2.)

It is clear that the Holy Spirit is not a third something which unites the subject and the object, the finite spirit and nature. As Hegel says, "Spirit is, however, the lord of nature, so that the two (nature and spirit) do not occupy a position of equal dignity in this unity, the truth being rather that the unity is Spirit. Spirit is no third something in which the two are neutralised, but, on the contrary, this indifference of the two is itself Spirit. At one time Spirit represents the one side, and at another is *that which overlaps*, which reaches over to grasp the other side, and is thus the unity of both." (Vol. I. p. 208.) The idea is that it is Spirit which is in the beginning, that it is Spirit which differentiates itself into subject and object, mind and nature, which limit each other, and it is also Spirit which is in

the end as ~~the~~ the Reconciler, the Enlightener and the Comforter.

Hegel identifies the Holy Spirit with Love. "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is eternal love. When we say God is love, we are expressing a very great and true thought; but it would be unreasonable merely to take this in such a simple way as a simple characterisation of God without analysing the meaning of love. For love implies a distinguishing between two, and yet these two are, as a matter of fact, not distinguished (*i.e.*, not separated), from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of myself, is the feeling and consciousness of this identity. My self-consciousness is not in myself, but in another, (*i.e.*, the object of my love), but this other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at peace with myself.....this other, just because it is outside of me has its self-consciousness only in me, (*i.e.*, as the object of its love). Thus the two are represented simply by this consciousness of their being outside of themselves and of their identity, and this perception, this feeling, this knowledge of the unity, is love." (Vol. III. Pp. 10, 11.)

Man, as thus related to God in unity and difference, "is essentially" says Hegel, "an object of interest to God" (P. 56) and "has an infinite, an eternal quality, namely that of being a citizen

in the kingdom of God. This is a quality and a life which is removed beyond time and the Past; and since it is at the same time opposed to the present limited sphere, this eternal quality or determination eternally determines itself at the same time as a Future. The infinite demand to see God, *i.e.*, to become conscious in spirit of his truth as present truth, is in this temporal present not yet satisfied so far as consciousness in its character as ordinary consciousness is concerned." (P. 105.) The immortality of the soul is emphasised in several passages of the *Philosophy of Religion* and those who read that book with an unbiased mind cannot have any doubt of Hegel's belief in the doctrine.

Now, I shall say only a word about Hegel's attitude towards historical Christianity. His reverence for Jesus Christ is unbounded, and he speaks of him as the incarnation of God in the sense that he felt himself one with God. We need not enter into the discussion how far Christ's life and teachings are historical and how far the latter are based on true philosophical insight. What is more important to us is Hegel's opinion that the unity with the Father which Christ is said to have felt—a unity not opposed to but in harmony with difference—is a condition which every man can and is destined to attain by the grace of God. It is evident therefore that man, however exalted in wisdom and

love, can be only an exemplar, never an object of worship, to brother man.

I shall now close with a few words on Hegel's view of worship. As man's consciousness of his finitude reveals the Infinite in him, so does his consciousness of his own sinfulness, his moral imperfection, reveal the perfectly Holy, the perfectly Good, in him. In the purely animal nature, even in man so long as he is immersed in animality, attending only to his sensuous wants and pursuing only his sensuous propensities, there is no distinct consciousness of the Holy, the Good. But as conscience awakes in him and makes him conscious of an ideal of which his real falls short, he necessarily thinks of a Being in which his ideal is realised. In fact it is the presence of the perfectly Good in him that makes him conscious of a contradiction in his life, a contradiction between the *is* and the *ought to be*, and gives rise to a struggle in him to remove it. In Dualistic religion goodness is something to be created, produced, in man, and and such goodness is never perfect. In the religion of Hegel, which recognises the essential unity of God and man, perfection exists in the real ultimate Self, that is God, in a realised form and man has only to see his unity with God to attain it. This indeed implies a struggle, a long and in one sense an interminable struggle, but at every stage of this struggle, the man of faith feels

that he is not engaged in a fruitless effort at something which is unattainable, but that his liberation is sure and already realised in the Absolute, with whom he is ultimately one in spite of all his shortcomings. The animal, sensuous nature, which is the cause of his imperfection and the struggle it gives rise to, has only to be annulled, abrogated,—not in the sense of eradicating it, but in that of bringing it under the control of his higher, spiritual nature. And this can be done in perfection, and we can, even in our present embodied life, feel ourselves at one with the All-good. For the finite animal nature is after all a semblance, an appearance, and not a reality in the fullest sense. It is already annulled and abrogated in our higher Self. The man of true faith sees this and he also sees that to be really perfect, he has only to keep up the consciousness of his unity with the All-good. Higher and higher ideals of perfection will indeed go on revealing themselves to him in his journey through the life eternal, but as soon as he sees such an ideal, he also sees that it is already realised in his real Self and that the required annulment of his animal nature, his narrow selfish desires, is already complete in that Self. The analogy of these teachings with the Vedantic teachings on liberation as not a *janya vastu*, a thing to be produced, but something eternally exist-

ing, though in a concealed form, as it were, in the Self,—something to be discovered rather than accomplished,—and on *jivan-mukti*, liberation while still living the sensuous life, will be seen by those who are familiar with Vedantic literature. What we miss in ordinary Vedantists is the moral fervour which characterises Hegel and Christian philosophers generally.

In worship we realise our unity with the Infinite and perfectly Good and have an actual enjoyment of perfect life. Hegel recognises various stages of worship, stages made necessary by different grades of theological knowledge and moral progress, but it is of worship in its highest form—a form in which the finite, though conscious of its difference from the Infinite (without which worship would be impossible) yet feels itself lost in and engulfed, as it were, by the Infinite,—that he likes most to speak. Let us hear from him directly about the spiritual life, and its culmination, worship, which is also the means of attaining it.

Of true freedom or *mukti*, Hegel says :—
“ Freedom itself, and reconciliation in worship or devotion are in the first instance formal reconciliation and freedom; if the subject is to be adequate to its conception or notion, it is necessary that its notion, that absolute Spirit, be for it Object as Spirit, for only by bringing itself into relation with its Essence in that absolute

content can the subjective spirit be free in itself. The truth is that it remains absolute for itself, and as infinite subjectivity, has the consciousness that it has infinite worth for itself, or on its own account, and is the object of the infinite love of God." (*Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I. p. 230.)

Of the spiritual life and the imperfect conception of it in some philosophical schemes, he says : " I am to make myself such that the Spirit may dwell in me, that I may be spiritual. This is my work, the human work, and that same work is God's, regarded from his side. He moves towards man, and is in man through man's exaltation of himself. What seems to be my act is then God's, and conversely too, what seems his is mine. This, it is true, runs counter to the merely moral standpoint of Kant and Fichte; there goodness still remains something which has yet to be brought forth, to be realised, and continues, too, to be something that ought to be, as if it were not already essentially there. Here is a world outside of me, which as forsaken of God waits for me to bring the end, the good, into it. The sphere of moral action is limited. In religion, on the contrary, goodness, reconciliation, is absolutely complete, and exists on its own account; the Divine unity of the spiritual and the natural world is presupposed—the particular self-consciousness being regarded as

belonging to the latter—and the whole question concerns only myself and has reference to myself, and centres in this, that I lay aside my subjectivity and take and have my share in that work which eternally completes itself. According to this, goodness is in no sense something which merely ought to be, an ideal, but is, on the contrary, Divine power, eternal truth.” (p. 228.) As Hegel says elsewhere: “It (that is goodness as the reconciliation of the finite and the Infinite) is already perfected in and through God, and it is this divine reality which man is to take to himself as his own.” (p. 244.)

Of worship, he says: “In worship, God is on the one side, I am on the other; and the essential characteristic here is that I enclose myself with God within myself, know myself in God as my truth, and God in me. The essential thing is this concrete unity.” (p. 221.) Again: “What worship has to accomplish is not the separation of anything from the Object, or the alteration of anything in it, nor the establishing of its own claims with regard to it. Its end, on the contrary, is essentially absolute reality, and this end is not one which has still to be produced, or created, but one which is only to have actuality in me; it is, therefore, opposed to me, opposed to my particular subjectivity. This last is the husk, which is to be stripped off.

I am to be in the Spirit and the Object is to be in me as Spirit.” (p. 227.)

The substantial unity of these views with those taught in the Upanishads will be evident to those who have studied the latter closely. Those of you who attended my lectures on the “Theism of the Upanishads” cannot have any doubt of the deep harmony of Western Idealism with the Idealism of our own *rishis*. May we diligently follow the lofty ideals set forth by both our ancient and modern teachers !

APPENDIX TO LECTURE VI

HEGEL ON IMMORTALITY *

To understand Hegel's view of immortality one must have a clear idea of his teachings on the relation of the finite to the Infinite. His idea of this relation is very different from the popular idea, which conceives the finite spirit as something which begins to exist at a particular time and whose continued existence is therefore more or less doubtful and has to be established by specific proofs; but it is not far removed from the views on the subject held by the right wing of the Vedantic school,—those, for instance, which are expounded in the Indra-Prajápati Sambáda of the *Chhándogya Upanishad* and the Indra-Pratardan Sambáda of the *Kaushítaki*. It would not therefore be quite unintelligible to those who are familiar with the teachings of our ancient sages.

To Hegel the finite spirit is not anything apart from or independent of the Infinite. It is an essential and necessary moment or aspect of the Infinite Spirit and has therefore immortality or eternality stamped, as it were, on its very nature.

* Reprinted from the *Indian Messenger* of September 20, 1920 in which it appeared as an article.

Hegel expounds this characteristic of the finite in numerous passages in his *Logic* and his *Philosophy of Religion*. The following passage, taken from the first volume of the latter, will be found to be quite lucid. The words enclosed in brackets are our own explanations of such of Hegel's expressions as may present difficulties to the ordinary reader. He says :—

“ In Reflection [that is, in popular thought] the finite stands opposed to the Infinite in such a way that the finite is doubled [the Infinite really becoming finite in opposition to the latter.] What is true is the indissoluble unity of the two. This it is which we have just considered in a more concrete form as the relation of the subjective Ego to the Universal. The finite is but an essential moment of the Infinite, the Infinite is absolute negativity (i.e., negation of negation) that is, affirmation, which, however, is mediation within itself [i.e., containing within itself its own relation to the finite.] The simple unity identity, and abstract affirmation of the Infinite is, in itself [without the relation referred to] no truth, but rather is it essential that it should differentiate or break itself up within itself. In this process it is in the first place affirmation [the abstract Universal or Infinite without distinction, the Father], and then secondly, distinction [that of the Infinite and the finite, the Father and the Son]; thirdly, the affirmation

appears as the negation of the negation [the distinction or difference as not opposed to but in harmony with the unity, the Holy Spirit], and thus for the first time as the True [the Concrete Universal or Infinite.] Nor does the standpoint of the finite [as something independent of the Infinite] represent any more that which is true. On the contrary it must annul itself [i.e., know itself as not independent] and it is only in this act of negation that we have what is true. The finite is therefore an essential moment of the Infinite in the nature of God, and thus it may be said it is God Himself who renders Himself finite, who produces determinations within Himself." (P.p. 197, 198.)

The three moments of the Divine nature must not however be supposed to be *events*; they exist eternally in that nature and appear in time only to our limited vision,—to abstract thought.

"In the third," says Hegel, "God is Spirit, we say, but He is *presupposed* to be this as well [i.e., thought of as Spirit also in the other moments] and the third is also the first. This is a truth which must be held to be essential." (Vol. III, pp. 25, 26). Again: "*The last is the first.*" (P. 26.)

The italics are Hegel's own. On the same page he says, "What is produced was already there from the beginning." The first two mo-

ments, however, as already implied in the foregoing statements, are more or less abstract, and the third, that of the Father as manifested to the Son,—the Son knowing himself as distinct from and yet as essentially one with the Father,—is the only concrete and in that sense the true form of the Divine nature. To think therefore that the form in which we know God in our highest or most rational mood, that is, as our Father with whom we are in both unity and difference, or in other words that we, as sons knowing the Father as such, will pass away, and the Father alone, without the son, will remain, is to forget the true nature of God, and believe in an abstraction. As Hegel says : “ The form [i.e., the concrete form] of this Idea [the triune nature of God] exists in God only as Spirit ; if the Divine Idea exists in those forms which belong to finitude [i.e., as the Father limited by the Son, or the Son by the Father], it is not in that case posited in its true and entire nature, in-an-forself ; it is only in Spirit that it is so posited.” (P. 27).

Now, as to Hegel's positive utterances regarding immortality, if he had said nothing else than what follows immediately, this in itself would be an absolute proof of his belief in immortality. Speaking of true freedom, he says : “ Freedom itself, and reconciliation in worship or devotion. are in the first instance formal re-

conciliation and freedom : if the subject is to be adequate to its conception or notion, it is necessary that its notion, that Absolute Spirit, be for it object *as Spirit*, for only by bringing itself into relation with its Essence in that absolute content can the subjective spirit be free in itself. The truth is that it remains absolute for itself, and as infinite subjectivity has the consciousness that it has infinite worth for itself, or on its own account, and is *the object of the infinite love of God.*" (Vol. I, p. 230). The italics are ours. That what Hegel believes as " the object of the infinite love of God " could yet be thought of by him as perishable, would indeed be a bold conjecture. There are, however, numerous other passages in the book we have quoted from in which he gives expression to his belief in human immortality in an unmistakable manner. We quote only two more. On page 79 of Vol. I he says :

" The idea which a man has of God corresponds with that which he has of himself, of his freedom. Knowing himself in God, he at the same time knows his imperishable life in God; he knows of the truth of his Being, and therefore the idea of the *immortality of the soul* here [in Christianity or "the perfect religion"] enters as an essential moment into the history of religion. The ideas of God and of immortality have a necessary relation to each other; when a man

knows truly about God, he knows truly about himself too : the two sides correspond with each other." Again : "The idea of immortality hangs together with the idea of God. It always corresponds, in short, with the stage at which the metaphysical conception of God has arrived. The more the power of spirituality is conceived of in accordance with its content in an eternal form, the worthier is the idea of God, as well as the idea of the spirit of the human individual and of the immortality of the spirit. (Pp. 314, 315).

All that we have said above will be confirmed by Hegel's lengthy treatment of the Spiritual Community as the Kingdom of the Spirit in the *Philosophy of Religion*. We close with only one short quotation :—"The third stage is represented by the inner place, the Spiritual Community, *existing at first in the world, but at the same time raising itself up to heaven*, and which as a Church already has Him in itself here on earth full of grace, active and present in the world." (Vol. III. p.3). The italics are ours.

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